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Abstract 
 
The objective of this thesis is to fully deconstruct and isolate the considerable Samnite 
contributions to the Roman state during the period of the Samnite Wars.  Although the 
literary sources have espoused a Samnitic origin for many Roman institutions, very little 
academic focus has been directed towards these claims.  Scholars have generally tended 
to focus on one or two of these claims only as part of a larger argument.  Thus no 
comprehensive examination of Romano-Samnite interactions exists, with the majority of 
studies depicting a unilateral process of Romanization.  Since the Romanization of the 
Samnites has been widely documented, this study will focus on the reverse process, a 
“Samnitization” of Roman society.  This will be achieved by examining the potential 
Samnite origins of the Roman military oath, gladiatorial munus, and the manipular 
organization and its armaments. Although the available literary and archaeological 
evidence prevents any definitive conclusions, these institutions appear to have significant 
Samnite elements; this illustrates a vibrant society which was not dominated by Roman 
society, but actively interacted and integrated with it.      
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Introduction 
“Qui vincit non est victor nisi victus fatetur” 
-Quintus Ennius, Annales 
 
Of all of Rome’s greatest adversaries, the Samnites are probably the least 
understood.  Arising from unknown origins, the Samnites first emerged into western 
history in the fourth century BC, quickly carving out a small empire in central Italy which 
exceeded that of Rome’s meager Latin holdings.  Brought together by territorial 
expansion into the Liris valley, conflict between Rome and the Samnite tribes was 
imminent.  Initially stemming from a regional conflict between the Samnites and a lesser 
Oscan tribe, the Samnite Wars eventually escalated into a battle for Italian hegemony.  
Although Roman conquest of the Samnite heartlands brought these wars to a close, it did 
little to curtail Samnite resistance to Rome.  When Pyrrhus challenged Roman hegemony 
in Italy, the Samnites rallied to his banner.  Following the catastrophic defeat at Cannae, 
the majority of the Samnite tribes again cast off the Roman yoke, throwing their support 
behind Hannibal.  Two centuries after the formal surrender of the Samnites in 290 BC, 
they retained their opposition to Roman rule, proving to be the dominant force behind the 
Social War.
1
  Even after the defeat of the Italian allies and their armies in 88 BC, the 
Samnites continued to plague the Roman Republic.  Following the Samnite defeat at the 
Battle of the Colline Gate, Sulla declared that peace was impossible so long as the 
                                                             
    
1
Although sometimes called the Marsic War, the Social War could easily called a Fourth\Fifth 
Samnite War –depending on if one accepts Salmon’s suggestion of the Pyrrhic War as being another 
Samnite War.  Of the 12 Italian rebel groupings, at least 6 can be classified as Samnite.  Cf. Salmon, 
Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 1.    
2 
 
Samnites remained unified.
2
  Descending upon the Samnites with zealous fury, Sulla 
ostracized or slaughtered every prominent Samnite he came across.
3
  Sulla’s ethnic 
cleansing campaign ended Samnite antagonism and resistance to Rome permanently, 
after which they were fully assimilated into Roman society.       
 From the fourth to first centuries BC, the Samnites twice achieved what even 
Hannibal could not: establish a pan-Italian anti-Roman coalition.  In the Third Samnite 
War, they were successful in creating an alliance with the Celts, Etruscans, Umbrians, 
and select Greek city-states, while achieving a similar feat amongst Roman socii in the 
first century (all dates BC unless otherwise noted).  For all their defiance, the Samnites 
were never able to fully disrupt Roman hegemony, as despite numerous Samnite 
successes, the Roman state was always able to recuperate.  Yet the Samnites had a 
profound impact on the evolving Roman state, the sum of which is substantially greater 
than their abortive struggles for Italian hegemony. Tempered by the fires of war, the 
Rome that emerged from the Samnite Wars was a different entity than the sleepy city-
state of beforehand.  New institutions, new faces, and new lands were integrated into the 
tapestry of Roman society due to Roman interaction with the Samnitic tribes. Thus, this 
study will attempt to illustrate the significance of the Samnite legacy upon Roman 
society. 
  While Samnite society remained relatively independent until its final 
assimilation in the first century AD, due to obvious limitations this paper will focus on 
the periods surrounding the Samnite Wars and Pyrrhic War.  Unfortunately, given the 
                                                             
    
2
Strabo, V: 4:11.  
    
3
Strabo, V: 4:11.  
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dubious nature of sources and the sheer quantity of potential Samnite contributions, this 
also proves to be a Herculean task.  In an attempt to provide an exhaustive exploration of 
each factor, inclusiveness will be sacrificed and many potential Samnite contributions 
will not be discussed.  Thus, this study will only examine the Samnitic origins of 
gladiatorial combat, the mandatory soldier’s oath, and the formation and weaponry of the 
maniple system.  Among those contributions omitted are the Samnite influences on 
Roman foreign policy, land reforms, and the emergence of a patrician-plebian 
aristocracy.
4
  While these adaptations prove to be due to indirect Samnite influence rather 
than any perceived Samnitic origin, this is not the rationale for their omission; rather 
these were not included as they are generally accepted by contemporary scholars, being 
less contentious in nature than those which will be discussed.  Furthermore, while it has 
been suggested that Rome learnt cavalry tactics from the Samnites, this will not be 
discussed, as Samnites outside Campania do not seem to have been overly versed in 
cavalry.
5
  Thus, this thesis will be limited to the Samnitic origins of the pilum, scutum, 
maniple, ius iurandum, and gladiatorial games in order to illustrate the bi-lateral nature of 
Romano-Samnite relations and the relative sophistication of Samnite society. 
                                                             
    
4
Samnitic influences helped shape Roman foreign policy by forcing the Romans to adapt to the geo-
political realities of the Samnite Wars.  The iconic Roman policy of road building started in 312 BC, 
as Rome needed a reliable way to manage the logistical issues of sustained conflict in Campania.  
Livy, IX: 29: Diod. XX: 36:  Samnite holdings were substantially larger than those of Rome, 
bordering Campania and Latium.  In order to prevent Samnite incursions into Roman Campania, 
Rome established military colonies to hold regions of strategic significance.  While this had occurred 
prior, during these wars colonies were established for a strictly offensive, rather than defensive 
purpose.  One key example is at Fregellae, where the Romans established a colony directly within 
Samnite territory to provoke and weaken the Samnites:  Livy VIII: 22:2.  
    
5
The highlands of Samnium seem a poor place for the emergence of skilled equestrians.  It is 
probable that the Samnites learnt of cavalry tactics from Etruscan and Greek influences during their 
expansion into Campania in the fifth century BC.  
4 
 
In 1965, Arnold Toynbee released his magum opus on the Punic Wars.  In three 
volumes, he provided a detailed analysis of the drastic affects of the Hannibalic War 
upon the Roman state.  He succinctly argued that Hannibal, despite his failures militarily, 
irreparably altered the Roman world, contributing heavily to the eventual fall of the 
Republic.  Regrettably, Toynbee was far too obsessed with his idea of cyclic decline and 
his nebulous notion of Nemesis, and thus wrongly depicted Hannibal as being the agent 
of the decline of Western Civilization.
6
  While many of the structural changes often 
attributed as being post-Hannibalic phenomena have recently been shown to have been 
pre-existing trends, the Punic Wars nonetheless deeply affected the evolution of the 
Roman state.
7
  Yet Toynbee was correct  in asserting that any ‘great war’ will profoundly 
accelerate the evolution of the nations involved, as no state exists in a vacuum.
8
  The 
same is true of Romano-Samnite relations.   
Unlike the Roman-Carthaginian Wars, which lasted just over a century, Roman 
conflict with the Samnites spanned  three centuries.
9
  Living in such close proximity for 
such an extended period of time, it is not surprising that these two societies deeply 
influenced each other.  While the Romanization of Samnite society is well-documented, 
too often the Samnite contributions to the Roman state have been dismissed simply due to 
                                                             
    
6
The fall of the Republic, contrary to the assertions of Toynbee, did not usher in a process of 
Roman stagnation and decline.  Rather Rome under the Empire remained vibrant, healthy, and 
progressive until its fall.  Cf. Peter Heather, the Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome 
and the Barbarians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
    
7
Tim Cornell, “Hannibal’s Legacy: The Effects of Hannibalic War on Italy,” Bulletin of the 
Institute of Classical Studies 41, no. S67 (Feb 2011): 98.  He cites the emergence of the Roman slave 
economy which, although traditionally believed to have emerged after the Second Punic War, 
probably originated during the period of the Samnite Wars. 
    
8
Arnold J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy: the Hannibalic War’s Effects on Roman Life, vol. 1 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 2. 
    
9
The end of the Second Punic War represents the end of bilateral warfare, as by the Third Punic 
War, Carthage was entirely at the mercy of Rome.  After this war, Carthaginian Africa is quickly 
Romanized.  The Samnites, despite being conquered in 293, nonetheless remained a powerful and 
distinct society under Roman rule.    
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ancient biases.  The most common of these is the portrayal of the Samnite as being the 
archetypical primitive highlander.  Espoused by the classical authors, this misconception 
was embraced by the father of Samnite studies, E. T. Salmon, who portrayed the 
Samnites as an idyllic pastoral people: poor, simple, yet honest.
10
  While he pioneered 
this area of research, his depiction of the Samnites has resulted in a unilateral 
understanding of Samnite-Roman exchanges, with Rome being the driving force.  
Although recent scholars have attempted to correct this, applying a holistic, reciprocal 
approach to Samnite-Roman relations, Salmon’s axiom remains extremely prevalent.  
This has resulted in a tendency for scholars to dismiss Samnite culture entirely; Alison 
Futrell referred to the Samnites as being unsophisticated barbarians who, despite their 
martial prowess, had nothing worth emulation.
11
  This assertion, however, proves 
ungrounded, as Samnite culture remained vibrant even within the Roman Republic.  
Oscan remained the dominant language in south-central Italy until the first century BC; 
Ennius choose to learn Oscan alongside Greek and Latin, attesting to its significance.
12
  
Samnite culture would even persist into the early empire as Horace, a self-identifying 
Samnite, often spoke of Samnite superstitions.
13
   Not only did Samnite society persevere 
long after Roman conquest, but it actively interacted with Roman society, with cultural 
exchanges occurring as early as the fourth century.  One notable example is the vulgar 
                                                             
    
10
This representation comes from Horace and Livy.  Livy IX: 13:7: Horace, Odes, 3:6. While Livy 
portrayed them as hostile barbarians, Horace portrayed them as being the ideal Roman soldiers, being 
austere farmers uncorrupted by luxury.   
    
11
Alison Futrell, Blood in the Arena: The Spectacle of Roman Power (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1997); 14, 19. 
    
12
Gel. XVII:17:1. 
    
13
Hor. Carm. 17:28. That Samnite practices could still be distinguished after centuries of Roman 
occupation, Sulla’s resettlement, and Latin resettlement by the triumvirates, shows a pervasive 
culture: Horace although, Samnite, was uncertain whether he belonged to Lucianan or Apulian branch.   
Hans-Christian Gunther, “Horace’s Life and Work,” in Brill’s Companion to Horace, edited by Hans-
Christian Gunther (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2013), 7.  Cf. Hor. Sat. II: 1:24: The usage of the word 
“Samnite” will be discussed anon. 
6 
 
theatrical plays of the Samnites, the so-called Atellanae fabulae, which were readily 
adopted into Roman society.  (The relative vulgarity of the Osco-Samnites appears to be 
an accurate cultural feature.
14
)  Thus Samnite society did not experience a process of 
“Romanization,” which implies a relative pacification of Samnite culture, but rather 
underwent a process of mutual adaptation and cultural exchange.  
Hopefully, through a re-examination of Samno-Roman relations, a historical 
depiction of the Samnites can emerge, free from the preconceptions of Salmon’s noble 
savage and Futrell’s uncivilized barbarian.    
Samnites, Saunitai, Sabellians, and Safini 
   One of the major difficulties in studying the Samnites is that there is an apparent 
lack of consistency among scholars as to what defines a Samnite; this term proves 
extremely convoluted, being applied to all Oscan speakers, to all non-Greek\Latin 
Italians, or simply to the tribe of the Pentri.  The title ‘Samnite’ itself is not of Latin 
origin, as Salmon argued this term derives from the Oscan toponymic Safinim, and that 
the tribes of Samnium probably referred to themselves as Safineis, or something akin to 
this (Safin-).
15
  Although there is archaeological evidence dating from fifth century BC 
Abruzzo that suggests that Safin- was indeed an ethnic nomen, it proves rather broad, 
encompassing tribes from around Pietrabbondante to tribes around Sant’Andrea.16  The 
usage of the term Safin- as a self-identifying label also appears to diminish after a 
                                                             
    
14
Athaneus stated that the Italiote Greeks adopted a practice of shaving in public, including genitals, 
from the Samnites.  Athaneus, 12:14.  Furthermore, Horace blamed his bellicosity on his Oscan 
ancestry. Hor. Sat. I:6. 
    
15
Salmon, 28.  
    
16
Emma Dench, From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples 
of the Central Apennines (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 200.   
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suspected fragmentation of Safin- peoples in the fifth to fourth centuries BC.
17
  
Synonymous with the problematic Oscan Safin- is the Latin Sabellus, which is used 
indiscriminately by classical sources when referring to Sabine and Samnite tribes.
18
  Both 
of these terms prove to be pan-ethnic titles for a believed cultural and linguistic grouping 
within central Italy.
19
  Since these terms lack specificity, they only sow confusion and as 
such, need to be used with extreme caution.
20
     
 Unlike the ambiguous Safin- and Sabelli, the term “Samnite” is much easier to 
define: the inhabitants of Samnium proper.  Within the Latin tradition, the Samnites were 
composed specifically of four main tribes, the Pentri, Hirpini, Caraceni, and Caudini.  
More than a simple geographical association, these four tribes also organized themselves 
into a strong political confederation.  It is this political affiliation which formed Rome’s 
primary antagonist during the eponymous Samnite Wars.  Yet despite this simple 
definition, the Latin writers display inherent inconsistencies within their usage of the 
term Samnite.  Livy’s usage of Samnite is particularly confusing as he often refers to the 
Hirpini and Caudini as being separate from the “Samnites.”21  These inconsistencies are 
                                                             
    
17
Dench, 202.  
    
18
Plin. Nat, III:12; Livy, VIII:1:7: In contrast to these authors, the Latin poets generally used Sabelli 
solely to refer to the Sabini- although Horace’s usage of Sabellian may prove an exception:  Hor. Sat. 
II: 1:24: Here Horace is clearly referring to the Roman expulsion of the Samnites at Venusia- unlikely 
to mean Sabine. 
    
19
For more on modern and ancient perceptions of identity within the larger central Apennine 
cultural grouping, see Dench, 178-200.  
    
20
Safin- will be used as only a collective term to refer to the Umbro-Oscan speaking tribes of the 
central Apennines, while the problematic Sabellian will not used.  
    
21
This usage suggests that the Pentri and Caraceni were the “Samnites” to the exclusion of the 
others.  Yet he stated that the Pentri alone, of all the Samnites, did not declare in favour of Hannibal:  
Livy, XXII: 61:11: He cannot be referring to the Caraceni as they are believed to have been absorbed 
by the Pentri and Frentani following the Pyrrhic Wars.  Thus there must have been a fracturing of the 
‘Samnites’: Salmon, 44.   
8 
 
probably due to fluctuating political associations and group identities after the second 
century BC.
22
  
 While a geographic understanding of the term Samnites proves simple and easily 
understandable, it offers significant complications.  Of particular concern are the Samnite 
colonies\tribes established in nearby areas.  The Campani, who sparked the Samnite 
Wars, were Samnites themselves, having invaded Campania sometime in the fifth century 
BC.
23
  While the Campani were nominally Samnite colonists, retaining a large amount of 
Samnite culture alongside the pre-existing Etruscan and Greek influences, they remained 
geographically and politically separate from their ancestral kinsmen.  Another 
problematic issue comes from the  Lucanians, who are often included within the 
‘Samnite’ grouping.  Like the Campani, the Lucani are believed to have been Samnite 
colonists who settled in the region of Lucania via the tradition of ver sacrem (sacred 
spring).
24
  This same tradition likewise asserts that the Bruttii were themselves colonists 
of the Lucanians.   This, however, is suspect, as Lucanians and Bruttii are usually treated 
separately from the Samnites within the primary sources.  Yet Scylax stated that the 
territory of the Lucani originally stretched from Lucania to Bruttium, suggesting that the 
Bruttii had indeed originally been Lucani.
25
  If this tradition can be believed, it coincides 
with the apparent trend of colonization and fragmentation seen amongst the Safin- in the 
late fifth century.
26
  Assuming that the Lucani were indeed of Samnite stock, a problem is 
                                                             
    
22
Dench proposes that the Pentri, by remaining loyal to Rome during the Punic Wars, became 
powerful enough to assert themselves as ‘the Samnites’ (Safin-) to the exclusion of the other tribes.  
Dench, 210.  
    
23
Salmon, 60.  
    
24
Strabo, V:III:I; For a description of a ver sacrum Cf. Strabo V:4:12. 
    
25
Scylax, 3,-4. § 12, 13;   
    
26
This appears to be a common and accepted aspect of Osco-Samnite societies, which lacked the 
political bureaucracy need to maintain political control over its colonies.  Rather the conditions of the 
9 
 
posed as to whether they should be called “Samnites.”  Although they do not fit into the 
geographical area of Samnium, unlike their Campani brethren they often operated in 
close cooperation with the tribes of Samnium proper.  It is even possible that the Oscan 
tribes of Lucania would, at times, be members of the Samnite League; this, however, is 
mere conjecture, as little information on this shadowy political entity has survived, and 
nothing can be stated with certainty concerning its membership.  The Lucani were 
politically, linguistically, and ethnically Samnite, just not geographically. 
 Another point of contestation is the inclusion of the Frentani within the “Samnite” 
moniker.  The Frentani are specifically called a Σαμνιτικὸν ἔθνος (Samnitic Tribe) by 
Strabo, and Scylax placed their territory amongst that of the Samnites.
27
  Yet Livy 
mentions the Frentani separately from the Samnites proper and Polybius includes them 
amongst the Marsian rather than Samnite tribes.
28
 In an attempt to explain this apparent 
contradiction, Niebuhr suggested that the Frentani had originally been a part of the 
Samnite League, but left in favour of joining the Marsian Confederation of their northern 
neighbours.
29
  This assumption seems valid, as the Frentani are first mentioned in conflict 
with Rome, but at the close of the Second Samnite War they are mentioned as voluntarily 
seeking an alliance with Rome alongside their Marsic neighbours.
30
 Thus like the Lucani, 
the Frentani were ethnically, linguistically, and politically Samnite.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ver sacrum seem to imply that Samnite colonists were charged with founding new tribes, politically 
independent of their previous affiliations.  Thus the Brutti may have separated from the Lucani in the 
same manner the Lucani separated from the Samnites.     
    
27
Strabo V:IV:II; Scylax, 15.   
    
28
Livy, IX:12; Polybius, II:24:12.  
    
29
Barthold Georg Niebhur,  The History of Rome: the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western 
Empire, vol. II, translated by Julius Charles Hare and Connop Thirlwall (London: Taylor and Walton,  
1828), 84. 
    
30
Livy IX: 45:18.  
10 
 
 When Salmon set about establishing the parameters for the term “Samnite,” he 
used it in a strictly geographic sense, meaning the inhabitants of Samnium.
31
  Outside the 
residents of Samnium, he grouped the Lucanians, Frentani, and Campani under the word 
Sabellian.  Not only is the term Sabellian problematic in itself, but his categorization of 
these tribes is erroneous. Under this heading, he also included tribes which he perceived 
to have been speakers of ‘Oscan proper,’ including the Sidicini, Brutti, Aurunci, and 
Mamertini.
32
  Yet Salmon’s usage of linguistic groupings proves rather flawed, as he at 
one point stated that belonging to the same linguistic family helped unify the insurgents 
of the Social War, but then claims that language played no part in establishing ethnic 
identity amongst the Lucanians and Samnites: according to him, the failure of the 
Samnites, Lucani, and Brutti to unite against Rome was due to differing racial strains.
33
  
These statements prove rather paradoxical.  In a critique of these views, Dench dismissed 
the racial and linguistic notions of Salmon, claiming them to be outmoded reflections of 
modern racist ideology which had no effect upon ancient relations.
34
  
 The linguistic grouping of Salmon’s Sabellian proves untenable.  Despite sharing 
a common dialect of Oscan, the Sidicini have few discernable connections to the tribes of 
Samnium and Lucania.  Furthermore, dismissing Salmon’s notions of racial antagonism, 
there is little reason to suspect that the Lucani, Campani, and Frentani were anything but 
Samnite in ethnicity; the Hirpani and Pentri often acted in direct contrast of each other, 
                                                             
    
31
Salmon, 33.  
    
32
Salmon, 33. 
    
33
Salmon, 95, 344. 
    
34
She argues that if Salmon had been correct, the Marsic tribes would have shown a greater 
affiliation with the Umbrians than they did with the Samnites: Dench, 213. 
11 
 
yet this is not a sign of different racial strains.
 35
  Rather, the alternating agendas of these 
Samnitic tribes can be attributed to simple politics, with each tribal confederation actively 
forging alliances according to current geo-political realities.   
 Unfortunately, outside of political affiliations, which are by nature fluid, there is 
little justification to isolate the Lucani, Campani, and Frentani from the Samnites.  The 
geographical location of these tribes is irrelevant, as ancient borders fluctuate between 
sources and over time. During the height of Samnitic power, the borders of the Samnites 
seem to have stretched throughout Italy, occupying lands far beyond their ancestral home.  
While the classical and modern evidence remains wildly conflictive, the Samnites seem 
to have spread along the fertile valleys of the Biferno, Sangro, Trigno, and Valfortone, as 
well as displacing the Volsci along the Liris in the Volturno  (See Figure 1).
36
  At some 
period, the Samnites also settled in the plains stretching from Campania in the west to the 
Brandus River in the east (See Figure 2).  While these borders seem appropriate, given 
the Samnite reliance upon river valleys for travel, it remains impossible to determine 
where Samnium began and Lucania or Campania began at any given period.
37
  Thus a 
geographical definition of the terminology, Samnite and Lucanian, proves erroneous, as 
Samnium and Lucania appear to be anachronistic titles applied to the perceived regions 
which these tribes inherited.    
                                                             
    
35
While the colonists in Lucania and Campania doubtlessly intermarried with the local tribes, this 
does not necessarily mean that they perceived themselves as being ethnically distinct from their 
Samnite brethren.  The Campani proved to be untrustworthy Roman allies, as likely to ally against 
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 Since these terms hold little relevance ethnically, linguistically, politically, or 
even geographically, it is hard to warrant their usage.  That the ancient authors seem to 
use Samnite, Lucanian, and Sabellian interchangeably only further attests to the 
Romano\Grecocentric nature of these terms.  Little evidence exists to support that these 
titles were ever used by these groups to self-define prior to Roman contact, with the 
exception of the problematic usage of Safin-.  The first usage of Lucanian to self-identify, 
comes from coinage dating back to the third century BC, with the title inscribed in Oscan 
and Greek, both using the Greek script: ΛOϒKANOM and ΛϒKIANΩN respectively.38  Yet 
as these coins are believed to have been minted to pay Hannibal’s Italian allies, the usage 
of this term is problematic, as not all of the Lucanian tribes allied with Hannibal.
39
  These 
‘Leukanoi’ seem to have been only those Lucanian tribes who joined the Punic cause. It 
is probable, then, that the tribes associated with Samnium and Lucania began to adopt the 
external titles of Samnite and Lucani, in order to promote a regional unity, at the expense 
of the inter-tribal Safin-. 
 Dench hypothesized that the broader identification of Safin-, declined as 
interaction and conflict with other groups promoted an emphasis on the pre-existing tribal 
entities; while previously Safin- was used by tribes of the southern Picene to distinguish 
themselves from the northern pὐpὐn-, increased contact with Greeks and Roman led to an 
emphasis on smaller sub-units, such as Vestini, Picentene, Curetes, etc.
40
  While this 
theory seems valid, at least for these northern Safin-, it cannot be fully applied to the 
entity of the Samnites.  Since the term Samnite appears to merely be a Latinized version 
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of Safin-, it does not correlate to any real tribal entity.  Rather the so-called “Samnites” of 
the classical sources probably referred to themselves by their tribal association: ie, 
Frentani, Hirpani, Caraceni, Pentri and Caudini.  Assuming that Samnite was 
synonymous with Safin-, this explains why the Lucanian tribes had no issue being called 
Samnites by the Greeks of Taras.
41
  This could also explain the confusion within Greek 
and Roman sources as to what defined a Samnite.  It seems likely that the Samnites\Safin- 
that came into conflict with Rome in the fifth century were merely a political association 
of these tribes, a Safin-League.  While this league was not comprised of all Safin- tribes, 
it was a collection of those Safin- tribes which resisted Rome, thus emphasising their 
collective pan-ethnic label in order to foster unity.
42
 Not only is this similar to the Lucani 
of the Hannibalic War, but this directly explains the drastic fluctuations of the terms of 
Safin- and Samnite within the sources. 
   Therefore, the idea of a collective group of tribes known as the “Samnites” only 
existed in direct relation to foreign pressures.  There was no such tribal association 
known as the Samnites, other than the shifting political association of Safin- tribes which 
appear in direct resistance to Rome.  Unlike the tribes which signed treaties with Rome, 
which were known by their tribal nomen, the label Samnite was a collective label applied 
to antagonistic Safin- tribes.  The Caudini, Frentani, and Hirpani are generally only 
mentioned individually after breaking with the larger Safin- coalition against Rome- 
either voluntary or after its destruction following the Pyrrhic War.
43
  Thus the 
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overarching term of Samnite seems to be a Greco-Roman construct, based on an 
extrapolation of inter-tribal relations. 
 While the use of the word Samnite proves both convoluted and anachronistic, 
there is a lack of suitable alternatives.  Safin-, Oscan, and Central Apennian are simply 
too broad of a categorization, while a lack of sources prevents any in-depth study of a 
particular tribe.  Thus the problematic label of Samnite must be retained. Unlike 
Salmon’s geographical context, however,  this study will use the term Samnite only to 
refer to the collective Oscan speaking tribes of the Frentani, Hirpani, Caudini, Pentri, 
Caraceni, as well as their colonies of the Campani, Lucani, Apuli, and Alfaterni.
44
  
Despite sharing a common language, the Sidicini and Aurunci will not be included under 
the Samnite label.   
Sources and Literature 
 One of the main issues in identifying the Samnite legacy in Rome is the unilateral 
history of their interactions.  Prior to the fifth century BC, the Samnites are believed to 
have been a primarily pre-literate society with written Oscan appearing sometime in the 
fourth century, heavily influenced by the Etruscan alphabet.
45
  Yet despite a growing 
literacy amongst the Samnite tribes, very few Oscan inscriptions have been found prior to 
the third and second century BC.  It seems safe to assume that literacy, while present, was 
not common amongst the Samnites until after their defeat in the Roman-Samnite Wars.  
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Even then, there is a lack of any substantial literature, with most being simple inscriptions 
and dedications.  One of the longest and earliest Samnite inscriptions is the Tavola Osca, 
or Oscan Tablet, which was discovered in Agnone and is a bronze tablet inscribed on 
both sides in Oscan (See Figure III).   While this tablet provides key insight into Samnite 
religious practices and Hellenic influences, it provides little insight into Samnite 
military\political institutions.
46
  
 While Oscan inscriptions have provided some interesting insight into Samnite 
society, no Samnite literature or accounts of the Samnite Wars exist.  This however, does 
not necessarily mean that no such literature existed, as the Atellan Farces suggest that 
Oscan literature existed as early as the fourth century.
47
  It seems likely, then, that 
Samnite literature did exist, but that it did not survive three centuries of conflict with 
Rome.  Yet if one ignores Salmon’s emphasis on written Oscan, there were many Oscan 
writers who wrote in Latin.  Among these were some of Rome’s greatest and earliest 
authors and poets: Ennius, Pacuvius, Gaius Naevius, Ovid, Velleius Paterculus, Horace, 
and Alfus Flavius arouse from Oscan-speaking regions. At least half of these authors 
probably descended from Samnitic tribes. Yet these authors wrote in Latin due to a 
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disdain for Oscan by Latin-speakers and an admiration of Latin by Oscan-speakers.
48
  
One can hardly blame these intellectuals for choosing Latin or Greek over Oscan, given 
the historical record of Latin-Samnite antagonism.  
Unfortunately, despite the existence of Samnite authors, none of them have 
provided a surviving narrative of Samnite society or their eponymous wars with Rome.  
Thus, any study of the Samnite tribes must rely entirely on external accounts.  The Greek 
sources of Polybius and Psuedo-Scylax provide the earliest extant information on the 
Samnites, but are laconic in their treatment of them; it not until the first century BC that 
the first glances of Samnite interactions with Rome are offered by classical sources.  Of 
utmost significance are the histories of Dionysius and Livy which provide the most in-
depth narratives of the Samnites of the fourth and third
 
centuries.  These histories are 
bolstered by select mentions of Samnites by Strabo, Appian, Dio, Pliny, and Silius 
Italicus.  Yet the most detailed account of Samno-Roman interactions remains Livy’s 
exhaustive, Ab Urbe Condite.  While Livy’s work is extensive, it is problematic, as it was 
written roughly three centuries after the events in question.  Since Livy lacked eye 
witness accounts, he was heavily reliant on the writings of priestly and consular annals.
49
 
Although these records date far back into Rome’s history, many of the earlier annalists 
relied upon the private records of the patrician houses, which, as Plutarch admits, were 
full of aggrandizing exaggerations and fictional figures designed to improve the standing 
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of the particular family in question.
50
  Yet the patrician families of early Rome were not 
alone in fabricating history, as Livy himself is guilty of tweaking events to further his 
personal agenda.  Into his history Livy incorporates a judicious use of artistic license in 
order to create a narrative that is both part sweeping epic and part moral cautionary tale.  
Because of this Livy, is far from being unbiased in his history, being heavily invested in 
the virtue of republican Rome, which was paramount in his creation of moral exempla for 
contemporary Romans.  Livy himself admitted that he was less concerned with historical 
accuracy than he was in extolling the virtue and accomplishments of the Roman people.
51
  
Nonetheless, Livy cited the work of earlier historians, such as Fabius Pictor, which would 
otherwise not be accessible to modern scholars.  Therefore, while Livy needs to be 
treated with caution, he remains the most extensive source on the Samnites and their 
interactions with Rome.  
Other than Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus provides the next most detailed 
account of the Samnites during the Samnite Wars. While he lacks the depth and 
continuity of Livy, he nonetheless provides valuable insight; this is especially true 
considering that Livy and Dionysius have some notable contradictions in their accounts 
of this period. Yet the best tool available to historians attempting to piece together a 
picture of Samnite society comes from archaeology rather than literature.  Of particular 
significance is the work of Adriano La Regina, whose excavations of the Samnite 
sanctuary at Pietrabbondante has provided a wealth of information pertaining to Samnite 
military practices, social institutions, and religious traditions.  Samnite pottery records 
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and other assorted material culture have further shed light on Samnitic society.  Gisela 
Schneider-Herrmann’s The Samnites of the Fourth Century BC is indispensible in this 
aspect, as she painstaingly collected and organized over 160 different forms of Samnite 
pottery and artwork from around Italy.  Yet the majority of information available on 
Samnite society comes from Samnite grave sites.  Although large-scale arms caches are 
rare, Samnite burial sites often included a weapon or two; although a few swords, 
helmets, and cuirasses have been discovered, the vast majority of these burial weapons 
are spears.  These material finds allow scholars to piece together the typical Samnite 
armament in contrast to the idealized Samnite hoplite depicted in their artwork.
52
  Even 
the skeletal remains of ancient Samnites help provide insight into the day-to-day 
conditions of ancient Samnites.   
Perhaps the most unique manifestation of Samnite society is found within the 
tomb frescoes uncovered around Campania.
53
  While the majority of these frescoes are 
concentrated within Campania proper, they have been discovered within necropoleis 
within Lucania and Samnium as well; unfortunately, the majority of tomb paintings of 
Samnium have been lost, particularly those around Allifae.  The necropoleis surrounding 
the Lucanian town of Paestum have produced a large number of intact Samnite frescoes 
which illustrates that they were not limited to solely to Campanian society, but spread 
throughout the Samnite world.   As no Samnite narrative detailing the events of the fourth 
and third centuries survives, these frescoes, when included with the larger range of 
Samnite artifacts, provide valuable insight into Samnite society.  Thus by comparing 
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Greco-Roman narratives with Samnite material culture, it becomes possible to explore 
the Samnitic origins of gladiatorial combat, the maniple, and the mandatory soldier’s 
oath.   
The following chapter will examine the origins of the gladiatorial munus, by 
examining the two major origin theories and their arguments.  Although the evidence for 
each theory incorporates a degree of etymological and literary sources, the majority of 
these arguments are based on an extrapolation of seventh to fifth century tomb frescoes 
from Etruria and Campania.  Chapter Two will explore the literary traditions concerning 
the Samnitic origins of the manipular legion and its armaments.  While each classical 
author provides a different, often contradictory explanation of these reforms, the Roman 
maniple, scutum, and pilum, are all described as having evolved from a Samnite model.  
Included within this chapter is a discussion of the emergence of manipular warfare and its 
Samnite influences.  This is not directly mentioned as being of Samnitic origins by the 
literary sources, due to the ancient preconception that the adoption of the pilum was 
synonymous with manipular tactics; yet since there is little reason to believe that the 
pilum was intrinsic to manipular tactics, they shall be discussed separately.  The final 
chapter will deal with the obscure oath taken by the Samnites at Aquilonia in 293 BC.  
Despite being depicted as a sacrilegious abomination by the Roman authors, this oath 
heavily influenced the later ius iurandum of Rome.  Allowing for the consolidation of 
consular power, the enactment of severe military discipline, as well as serving as a 
powerful equalizing factor, this military oath facilitated the development of Rome’s 
professional army. 
20 
 
Chapter 1 
The Origins of Gladiatorial Combat 
In the sixth century AD, Isidore of Seville categorized the Roman games into four 
distinct parts, gymnicus, circensis, scaenicus, and gladiatorius.
54
  Of these, the most 
stereotypically and distinctively Roman practice was that of the gladiatorial games.  
While other societies have practiced forms of armed duelling, the bloody spectacles of 
the gladiators have proven to be a uniquely Roman phenomenon.  Thus, while chariot 
racing, athletic competitions, and even theatre were popular throughout the 
Mediterranean world, gladiatorial combat was isolated solely within the boundaries of the 
Roman world. As Rome grew, so too did gladiatorial combat, with amphitheatres built 
throughout the expanse of its empire, from Britain to North Africa, from Spain to 
Mesopotamia.  Even in the contemporary age, the most iconic relic of Rome’s power and 
magnitude, the Colosseum, continues to attest to Rome’s favourite pastime.  
Yet for all the games’ importance, they are not believed to have been a Roman 
invention, but rather of an external, Italian origin.  While the exact origins of gladiatorial 
combat remains heavily debated, contemporary authors are largely divided between two 
main origin theories.  The first theory, which traditionally was the most influential, is the 
Etruscan origin theory, which states that gladiatorial combat arose in Etruria and then 
spread to Rome.
55
  The other school of thought embraces an Osco-Samnite origin theory, 
in which gladiatorial combat originated with the Oscan people and was spread to Rome 
via Campania.  Although both theories are supported by a variety of literary and 
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archaeological evidence, recently the prevalence of the Etruscan theory has been 
challenged, with more and more scholars embracing an Osco-Samnite origin.  Through 
an examination of the arguments and evidence for both theories, an Osco-Samnite origin 
for gladiatorial combat becomes apparent.  Thus the spectacula gladiatoria, which 
proved an influential and intrinsic part of Roman culture, belongs among the Samnite 
contributions to the Roman world. 
Before examining the evidence pertaining to the Samnite origins of gladiatorial 
combat, one must first clarify the problematic usage of terminology found within the 
primary and secondary sources.  In particular, the usage of the word munus proves rather 
problematic, given the word’s varying definitions.   Originally practiced in the context of 
a privately funded funeral which involved gladiatorial combat, the term literally means a 
‘duty’ or ‘obligation’.  Servius even describes the munus in the context of a ‘gift’ owed to 
a dead patron or family member.
56
  However, the term later comes to refer to any 
privately funded act of munificence, such as sponsoring games or the erection of a 
building, owed to the Roman people.  Generally, the term is used by contemporary 
scholars simply to mean a gladiatorial event, yet even this usage becomes blurred with 
the later addition of the venationes to gladiatorial spectacles.  In order to avoid 
unnecessary confusion, unless otherwise stated, any usage of the term munus will always 
refer to its earliest form: a gladiatorial combat occurring within the context of a funeral.  
Another point of confusion is the usage of ludi, particularly when discussing gladiatorial 
spectacles.  The term ludus most commonly refers to the great state-funded, religious 
festivals of Rome, such as the Ludi Apollinares, yet it also came to mean a gladiatorial 
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school.  As this can prove confusing, which is further exacerbated by the latter fusion of 
gladiatorial spectacles into the state festivals, any reference to a ludus will be done in the 
context of a state festival and will not be used to refer to a gladiatorial school. 
 The literary evidence concerning the origins of the gladiatorial games is rather 
contradictory.  Support for the Etruscan theory of origins stems primarily from the 
writings of Nicolaus of Damascus who, writing in the late first century BC, stated that: 
“Romans presented the games of gladiators... a practice which they were given from the 
Etruscans.”57  Unfortunately Nicolaus does not offer any further information other than 
this rather cryptic statement.   Furthermore, his statement merely implies that gladiatorial 
combat spread to Rome from Etruria, it doesn’t elaborate on whether it was of Etruscan 
origin or not.  Another passage, attributed to Suetonius, states “L. TARQVINIVS 
PRISCVS... hic prior Romanis duo paria gladiatorum edidit, quac comparauit per annos 
XXVI.”58  However, this passage, dating gladiatorial combat back to Tarquinius Priscus, 
is doubtlessly an anachronism, as the first recorded incident of Roman gladiatorial 
combat comes in the year 264 BC.
59
  Katherine Welch argued that this correlation of 
Roman gladiatorial games with Tarquinius Priscus was a ‘natural mistake’, as the 
Etruscan king was already credited for introducing the ludi circenses to Rome.
60
  Thus 
the literary evidence for an Etruscan origin is far from convincing; unfortunately the 
literary evidence for an Osco-Samnite origin proves no more compelling.  
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 The main literary evidence for an Osco-Samnite genesis comes from Livy, Strabo, 
and Silius Italicus.  All three of these sources describe a longstanding tradition among the 
Campanian elite of hosting gladiator fights to entertain guests at their banquets.
61
  
Although this alleged practice is mentioned to exemplify the limitless decadence of the 
villainous Capuans prior to their defection to Hannibal, this does not necessarily mean 
that no such tradition occurred; indeed, the Campanian practice of hosting combats at 
their parties is also testified to by the Greek writer Athenaeus.
62
  Furthermore, Livy’s 
account places one such instance of this tradition occurring after the conclusion of the 
Second Samnite War- c.308 BC- thus making this the earliest recorded reference to a 
specific instance of gladiatorial combat.
63
  Livy also suggests that on this occasion the 
‘Samnite’ gladiator originated.  Livy’s assertion has validity, as the Samnite type of 
gladiator was the earliest and only known gladiator type for most of the Republican 
period.
64
   
Etruria and Campania are not the only two potential locations of origin offered by 
the ancient sources, as Poseidonius stated that the Celts often enlivened their feasts with 
spectacles of combat.
65
  However, these events do not seem to fit the parameters of 
gladiatorial combat, as death was never the intended result, only occurring if the two 
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combatants lost control and the audience failed to intervene.
66
  Another opinion is offered 
by Hermippus and Ephorus who trace the origins of gladiatorial-style combat to the 
Arcadian city of Mantineia.
67
  Thus the literary evidence for an Etruscan or Osco-Samnite 
origin is inconclusive and frustratingly contradictory, doubtlessly illustrating the fact that 
by the first century AD the Romans themselves did not know its origins. 
 As the literary evidence proves counterproductive, scholars have turned to 
etymology to help shed light upon this nebulous issue.  In particular, proponents of an 
Etruscan origin typically have been more invested in etymological evidence than their 
Osco-Samnite supporting counterparts.  The keystone of the etymological argument 
comes from the writing of Isidore who stated that the word lanista, a gladiator 
trainer\dealer, derives from the Etruscan word for carnifex– or executioner.68  However, 
the presence of an Etruscan word- if it is indeed Etruscan- is not by itself conclusive of an 
Etruscan origin, particularly as the position of lanista is a latter evolution born out of the 
increasing commercialization of the gladiatorial games.  Not only does this have no 
bearing on the actual origins of the games, but it may not be an Etruscan word at all.  
Katherine Welch argues that the use of lanista is not significant, as many Latin first 
declension masculine proper noun endings similarly are believed to stem from the 
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Etruscan language.
69
  Thus, lanista may have no actual Etruscan connection, save sharing 
a distant linguistic association.  The use of the Etruscan sounding lanista may either have 
been an unrelated usage or a Roman adapted word originating from the language of the 
game’s birthplace; however, considering the earliest known gladiatorial schools, 
alongside the lanista themselves, emerged not in Etruria, but in Campania, the latter 
seems highly unlikely.  However, Futrell addressed this issue, believing that the presence 
of the ‘Etruscan’ lanista within a Campanian industry is enough of an oddity to suggest 
an outside origin for the games.
70
 This argument is untenable, as it suggests no other 
rationale for the presence of an Etruscan word within Campania; considering the 
nebulous usage of this term and the historical setting of Campania, there are many other 
explanations for this phenomenon.  Alexander Lindsay would suggest as early as 1872 
that lanista derived from the Etruscan words lón (to hire) and hazus\hastsus (an athlete), 
thus being a manager of athletes.
71
  Building on Lindsey’s theory, one could argue that 
lanista derived from lón and the Etruscan word for actor h(ister).  Thus lanista (lón-ister) 
may have been a pre-existing term for entertainment brokers within Campania when the 
Osco-Samnites invaded.  Another alternative is that the term lanista only came into being 
in the first century BC, as there are no earlier references to this position; outside of the 
literary records of Cicero, Martial, Livy, and Juvenal, the term lanista is rarely found on 
inscriptions.
72
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    Another gladiatorial institution which shares an Etruscan origin is that of the 
Charun, which was a hammer-wielding figure tasked with ensuring that recently slain 
gladiators were indeed dead.  However, as the Charun was not adopted until the time of 
Augustus and the Charun itself, an Etruscan god, was adopted from the Greek Charon, it 
holds little relevance to this argument.
73
  The etymological argument for the origins of 
gladiatorial games proves unconvincing, as the presence of an Etruscan word- assuming 
it is indeed of Etruscan origin- within an otherwise Campanian industry simply does not 
equate as being indicative of the event’s origins.  Looking at the linguistic evidence 
alone, it is known that the first gladiators were called Samnites, the gladiatorial managers 
were (the Etruscan-sounding) lanistae, and the earliest word for gladiators was bustuarii 
(funeral men), which is of Latin origin.
74
   
   Due to the contradictory and inconclusive nature of the literary and etymological 
evidence, the archaeological record proves indispensable; although the archaeological 
evidence is by no means conclusive, it helps substantiate the literary sources. The 
discovery of Etruscan tomb paintings has shed some light upon the funeral practices of 
Etruscan society.  These frescos, such as those from the Tomb of the Bigae, illustrate the 
variety of Etruscan funeral games, dating back to the sixth century BC.  Aside from the 
Etruscan fondness for chariot racing, these frescos clearly illustrate a variety of athletes 
which include armoured men.  Alison Futrell has no doubts concerning the identity of 
these armed men, claiming:  
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“There is nothing, in fact to prevent their reidentification as gladiators.   
 Indeed the depictions of the Pyrrhicists in the Tomb of the Bigae   
 seem to argue for such an interpretation... These armed men could   
  in fact be gladiators, of a type more conventional than Phersu.”75   
However, this statement appears to be little more than wishful thinking, as there is little 
evidence to suggest that these armed men ever actively engaged in combat.  In fact, 
Futrell’s “gladiators” not only appear without any obvious opponent, but are depicted in 
rather static poses.
76
  On the contrary, it appears that there is little evidence to suggest 
that these armed men were little more than performers, engaging in what is known as 
“Pyrrhic” dancing.  Pyrrhic dancing was a Greek form of dancing in which the 
performers wore armour and performed mock combat.
77
  Valuable insight into the 
Pyrrhic dance- πυρρίχη- is offered by Xenophon, who recorded a specific example of a 
Pyrrhic dance being performed by an Arcadian dancing girl.
78
  Although the Pyrrhic 
dance appears to have varied in usage and form amongst its practitioners, there are no 
recorded incidents of this dance involving bloodshed or actual combat.  Unlike in the 
case of gladiatorial contests, scholars unanimously agree that the Etruscans practiced 
Pyrrhic dancing; the fresco of the Grotta della Scimia Corneto clearly illustrates two 
pipers standing directly behind an armed man. 
79
  Thus, it is highly unlikely that these 
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armed men in the Etruscan paintings were anything other than stereotypical Pyrrhic 
dancers.     
 Another interesting aspect of Etruscan tomb paintings is the figure of Phersu, a 
mysterious bearded man sporting a conical helmet.  In the Tomb of the Augurs a painting 
was discovered of a Phersu holding the leash of an animal while it seemingly attacks 
another man.  Unlike the prior discussion concerning Pyrrhic dancers, there can be no 
doubt that this scene is one of combat, as the man being mauled has clearly visible 
wounds.  Scholars have offered a variety of interpretations for this obscure painting, 
which Welch summarizes:  
“[this scene can be seen] as an example of early gladiatorial combat,  
 as a prototype for the venatio or a damnatio ad bestias, as a    
 mythological scene of unknown nature, as an athletic event, or as a   
 propitiatory human sacrifice in Etruscan funeral ritual.”80  
 Welch sees the last option as being the least contentious, seeing nothing in this scene that 
resembles gladiatorial contests, venations, or damnatio ad bestias in later Roman art.
81
  
This appears to be a safe assertion, as the Etruscan fondness for human sacrifice is well 
documented in literary and archaeological sources.  However, supporters of an Etruscan 
gladiatorial origin believe that the Phersu game, being a form of human sacrifice, later 
evolved into a ritualized combat, finally resulting in gladiatorial combat.
82
  This, 
however, seems highly unlikely, as the victim in the Tomb of the Augurs appears to be 
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wielding a club and as such does not resemble a sacrifice.  Thus, these Phersu games 
were at best simply a precursor to the venationes\bestiarii.
83
   
  Assuming that the Phersu games were the basis of later Roman beast combats 
such as the venationes, they  have little correlation to the origins of gladiatorial combat, 
as the venationes were added to Roman spectacles latter than gladiatorial combat.
84
  The 
Etruscan origin theory, judging from the available archeological and literary evidence 
remains rather tenuous, with the only connection to gladiatorial combat being a 
hypothesis revolving around a cryptic Etruscan game, some non-descript dancers, and the 
presence of armed athletes in funeral frescoes.  The question that needs to be asked is, 
assuming that the munus was an Etruscan invention, why there are no clear depictions of 
gladiatorial combat within Etruscan art?  This remains a critical hurdle to the Etruscan 
theory of origins, as the Etruscans fostered a clear love of spectacle and games, which is 
clearly embodied within Etruscan art.  Chariot racing, foot races, and boxing 
competitions are pictured regularly in Etruscan tomb paintings.  In particular, boxing and 
wrestling matches are not only common fixtures in Etruscan frescoes but are depicted 
with the two contestants actively engaged (See Figure 4).  In contrast to these active 
portrayals of wrestlers, there are no authentic depictions of gladiatorial combat before 
250 BC.
85
  To judge from the available literary and archaeological evidence, the Etruscan 
origin theory proves less than persuasive.   
The archaeological evidence for an Osco-Samnite origin is far more compelling 
than that for the Etruscan theory.  Tomb paintings uncovered in Campania clearly attest 
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that gladiatorial combat was being practiced in this region by the fourth century BC.  A 
painting from Tomb LIII from the Andriuolo Necropolis in Paestum is often used to 
support the Osco-Samnite theory and proves rather persuasive upon examination.  Of 
significance is the presence of combat injuries, which strongly suggest that the men 
involved are neither mock-fighting nor sparring; first blood would have seen the end of 
such an event.  Thus there can be little doubt that the men depicted are actively engaged 
in life-or-death combat.  However, this by itself is irrelevant, as these frescoes could have 
been a depiction of a famous battle or mythological event.  Here the decorations hanging 
above the duelists prove extremely significant, as they suggest that this event is occurring 
in an enclosed arena rather than in a battlefield.  While this scene still could be a 
depiction of an Osco-Samnite myth, it is highly suggestive of gladiatorial combat.   
 That a form of gladiatorial combat was being practiced in fourth century 
Campania seems certain, as paintings from further tombs leave little room for objection.  
Not only do these paintings portray active combat between two opponents, unlike the 
Etruscan paintings they routinely show gladiatorial combat in all its gory details.
86
  One 
particularly graphic tomb painting discovered near Gaudo, Campania, seemingly 
illustrates the exact moment that a gladiator is slain- in this case, the defeated fighter 
appears to have taken a spear to the face.  Thus the Osco-Samnites were not squeamish 
about displays of violence.  Further paintings depict similar scenes of combat surrounded 
by chariots and spectators, heavily suggesting that this was combat for entertainment (see 
Fig.  5).  Given the archaeological evidence for gladiators in fourth century Campania, it 
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can be assumed with little difficultly that the Campani were indeed hosting gladiatorial 
combats at their banquets as Livy, Strabo, and Silius Italicus suggest.
87
 
 Although Livy and his compatriots described the Campani gladiatorial banquets 
with disdain, particularly the sacrilegious mixing of blood and food, their disgust proves 
rather ungrounded, as there is strong evidence to suggest that Campani gladiatorial 
games- at least originally- were conducted in a funerary setting.  One tomb painting 
which depicts a gladiatorial duel, notably includes a number of pomegranates in the 
background (See Figure 6).  Welch sees the presence of pomegranates, symbols of the 
afterlife, as an indication of the funerary context of these games.
88
  Aside from the 
presence of pomegranates, many images of gladiatorial combat occur beside or within 
close proximity to scenes of funeral proceedings.  For example, Tomb X at the 
Necropolis of Laghetto shows this type of gladiatorial fighting in close relation to the 
funeral of a woman.  Thus, Osco-Samnite gladiatorial combat probably had both religious 
and entertainment value.  Propaganda aside, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
gladiator feasts described by Livy were not performed in the context of a funeral- the 
Romans were likewise known for staging elaborate funeral rituals, such as the funeral 
games of Publius Licinius in 183 BC which lasted three days.
89
  In reality, the Campanian 
feast that Livy decried in 310 BC occurred just after a large Romano-Campanian victory 
in the Second Samnite War.  Considering that the Campanians had doubtlessly lost men 
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fighting for Rome, this “feast” may have been as much funeral as it was triumph.90  
Welch even argues that the munus in its earliest forms was as tied to warfare as it was to 
funerary rites.
91
  Thus, the Campani funeral munus was probably not as appalling to 
contemporary Romans as the later sources imply.   
Having considered the two arguments, the Osco-Samnite theory is by far the most 
convincing.  The absence of any conclusive evidence of gladiatorial combat in the 
Etruscan archaeological record relegates it to the realm of mere conjecture, supported by 
hypothetical assumptions.  In contrast, the Campanian archaeological evidence offers 
authoritative proof that gladiatorial combat was practiced, at least in Paestum, during the 
fifth century BC.  Furthermore, the earliest amphitheatres were located in Campania and 
Campania, not Etruria, remained the commercial center of the gladiatorial trade.
92
  Thus 
gladiatorial combat probably originated with the Osco-Samnites and not the Etruscans.  
While other alternatives have been offered by scholars, such as gladiatorial combat being 
a pan-Italic activity without a clearly definable point of origin, given the current available 
evidence, it appears highly likely that gladiatorial combat originated with the Osco-
Samnites.   
The archaeological evidence from Etruria and Campania strongly suggests that 
Campania was the earliest site of gladiatorial combat.  However, while the archaeological 
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evidence from Campania meshes with the literary tradition, it is nonetheless problematic.  
Of particular concern is the geographical proximity of these tomb frescoes depicting 
gladiatorial combat, as the majority of the Campanian tomb paintings comes almost 
exclusively from  around the Lucanian city of Paestum.  Furthermore, those tombs which 
deal explicitly with gladiatorial combat come almost exclusively from the necropoleis of 
Adriuolo and Laghetto, yet there are some notable exceptions from Arcioni and Gaudo 
which may qualify as depicting gladiatorial combat; this regional isolation makes it 
difficult to suggest that the munus was a wider Osco-Samnite, or even Campania 
tradition.
93
  Admittedly, the absence of similar frescoes in Capua is troubling, yet this is 
probably due to the historical turbulence of this region; many Capuan frescoes, which 
survived the ancient and medieval ages, were destroyed in World War 2. Given the 
literary tradition which specifically associates gladiatorial banquets with the Capuans and 
the archaeological evidence from Paestum, it seems safe to extrapolate that gladiatorial 
combat was a common facet of Samnite-occupied Campania. Another significant 
complication is that of the 200 known tombs around Paestum, only 10% of these have 
received much scholarly attention or extensive publication, thus drastically hindering 
research.
94
  This also makes it hard to attain exact dating for the Adriuolo-Laghetto tomb 
paintings, most of which are often cited simply by the century they hail, late fifth to mid 
fourth century.  While these dates are not exact, they nonetheless place these frescoes 
within the period of Samnite rule, further suggesting that this practice originated with the 
Samnite invaders of the fifth century.    
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 Even if the games eventually prove to be of non-Samnite origin, the Samnites are 
likely responsible for spreading the games to Rome.  Despite the contradictions within 
the literary sources, the underlying preconception shared by all Roman historians is that 
the gladiatorial games were not a native institution.  This is confirmed by the dearth of 
any references to gladiatorial combat in the Roman archaeological and literary record 
prior to the mid-third century BC.  Thus, even if gladiatorial combat had been a pan-Italic 
tradition, as some have suggested, it was not practiced natively in Rome.  The benefactor 
of Roman gladiatorial combat had to have been Campania.  During the period in which 
the earliest Roman gladiatorial games were celebrated, Rome’s focus was directed 
southward.  The earliest references to gladiatorial combat came out of Rome’s interaction 
with Capua during the Samnite Wars.  During this period Rome had just annexed the 
entirety of Campania and, as Roman garrisons came into contact with Campanian society, 
a cultural exchange was impossible to avoid.
95
  Livy recorded the initial culture shock 
experienced by the Roman garrison in Capua, which led to the rather obscure Capuan 
mutiny of 342.
96
  Out of this counter-cultural exchange between Roman militarism and 
Campanian opulence, the Romans must have acquired the gladiatorial tradition from 
Capua- Rome would quickly adopt this practice, hosting its first recorded munus in 264.
97
 
A more concrete connection between Campania and the 264 munus is offered by Kyle, 
who connects the munus of Decimus Junius Brutus Scaeva to the Campanian experience 
of the Roman consul of 317, another Junius.
98
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         Thus, in the sanguinary banquet halls of Campania, Rome came into contact with 
the Osco-Samnite tradition of gladiatorial combat.  The intermixing of blood and 
religiosity which the games provided quickly intoxicated the Roman populace and within 
a century they were embedded deep in the socio-political landscape of the Republic.  For 
their part, the Osco-Samnites were all too happy to facilitate the Roman affection for 
gladiatorial combat; not only did the Osco-Samnite cities of Campania become the 
commercial hub of gladiatorial schools, but many Samnites took to the arena 
themselves.
99
  Yet while the gladiatorial games played a pivotal role in the evolution of 
the Roman state – simultaneously proving to be the pinnacle achievement of Romano-
Samnite exchanges- the roots of this legacy are often overlooked.  This is not due so 
much to the dubious nature of its origins, but rather due to the location.  Because it was in 
Campania, not Samnium proper, that this exchange took place, the Samnite influence is 
muted; the Campani provoked the Samnite wars by allying with Rome against Samnium.  
Because the Campani were not members of the Samnite League, the political distinction 
between the Campani and Samnites is often misinterpreted as being a cultural and 
ethnical distinction.  This is not the case, as the Campani elite were primarily of Samnite 
stock, following a Samnite invasion in the fifth century which displaced the existing 
Etruscan ruling class.
100
  In the cities of Campania, the Samnite influence is easily noted, 
as Oscan became the primary language of Southern Italy.  Thus, despite recorded 
political differences, the Campani were nonetheless a Samnite grouping.     
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Although a lack of sources prevents any definitive conclusions from being made, 
the available evidence does suggest that gladiatorial combat originated with the Samnites, 
or even possibly the wider Safin-.  While the Samnite origin theory remains the most 
convincing, given the available evidence, the Etruscan origin theory cannot be fully 
dismissed; the munus may even have been a tradition of the non-Samnite Oscan 
Campanians, the so-called Opici\Osci, who are believed to have been the original 
inhabitants of Campania.  Therefore, the origins of gladiatorial combat remain nebulous, 
despite indications of Samnite influence.  What can be concluded with more certainty is 
that Samnite Campania was not only responsible for spreading gladiatorial combat to 
Rome, but was directly responsible for fostering its development; Campania remained the 
economic hub of gladiatorial combat for centuries.  In this manner, the gladiatorial games 
should be considered amongst any discussion of Samnite influences within Roman 
society. 
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Chapter 2 
The Samnite influences on the Roman military: the adoption of the 
Maniple, Scutum, Pilum, and manipular tactics. 
 
A common tradition within the Roman literary sources attributes many of Rome’s 
military armaments, along with the maniple organization itself, as being Samnite in 
origin.  While often espoused, this belief proves hard to substantiate, as the early 
organization of the Roman legions, like the majority of early Roman history, proves 
rather nebulous.  A combination of a dearth of contemporary sources and the 
preconceived biases of later Roman and Greek historians have ultimately coloured our 
knowledge of the army prior to Polybius.  While scholars are aware of a Roman military 
progression from a phalanx, to a manipular legion, eventually becoming a cohortal legion 
in the first century BC, how and when these reforms occurred remain uncertain.  Among 
the ancient scholars there was a longstanding tradition of ascribing these military reforms 
to the influence of great leaders, such as Camillus, Marius, and Servius Tullius. These 
assertions on the part of the ancient authors have often been met with incredulity by 
modern historians because of their comprehensive nature and their anachronistic dating.  
This issue of ascribing key reforms to select generals becomes increasingly problematic 
when dealing with earlier reforms; it is only further exacerbated by the fact that the 
earliest extant sources on these reforms were written centuries after their introduction.  
Modern scholars, therefore, not only need to deal with the anachronisms and literary 
traditions of the ancient sources, but also need to navigate a sea of shadowy figures to 
whom the major military reforms are ascribed; the Servian reforms provide a clear 
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example of this, as they are attributed to Servius Tullius, the legendary sixth king of 
Rome.      
Of particular significance to this thesis are the large-scale military reforms that 
occurred sometime in the fourth to third centuries BC.  Between the siege of Veii (396 
BC) and the outbreak of the First Punic War (264 BC), the Roman army had evolved 
from a hoplite militia into four legions organized into maniples.  Further organizational 
changes that occurred in this period included the adoption of the scutum (rectangular 
shield), pilum (Roman heavy javelin), and the stipendium (soldier’s wage); it has also 
been suggested that the Roman tradition of military camp building originated during this 
period.  Considering the sheer number of military reforms occurring in such temporal 
proximity to Rome’s colossal struggles with the Samnites, many of these innovations 
must have doubtlessly stemmed out of this conflict.  Unlike the instant and 
comprehensive transformations inferred by Livy and Plutarch, however, it is highly 
unlikely that the Roman legion changed overnight from phalanx to Camillan legion.
101
  
Although a few historians, such as E.T. Salmon, have reinforced the Livian chronology 
for these reforms, the majority of contemporary scholars tend to view these adoptions as 
individual occurrences in the gradual evolution of the Roman army.
102
  This is not to say 
that these reforms cannot overlap, as one or two of them may have.  Each of the military 
changes which occurred between the fourth and third centuries BC, therefore, must be 
analysed individually to assess whether or not it was adopted due to Samnite influences, 
starting first with the maniple organization. 
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 The earliest Roman legions are believed to have operated as phalanxes.  
According to the ancient sources, the Greek-phalanx system was brought to Rome by the 
Etruscans, doubtlessly under the rule of the alleged “Etruscan” kings.103  As a part of the 
overarching “Servian” reforms, the Roman hoplite militia was divided according to 
wealth into five distinct classes.  These classes not only served to provide a social and 
political hierarchy, but similarly provided organization to the Roman militia.  The first 
three classes were armed more-or-less in typical hoplite panoply and were intended to 
undertake the majority of combat, with the two poorest classes acting as skirmishers and 
light infantry.
104
  Under this model, the Roman legion resembled the hoplite armies of the 
Greek city-states.  Having the richest members of society in the front ranks was not only 
a class-privilege, but also served a practical purpose, as during this period each soldier 
was expected to supply his own weapons and armour, and only the richest classes could 
afford to arm themselves fully.
105
  There appears little reason to doubt the literary 
tradition in this, as it seems highly likely that hoplite warfare inevitably spread to the 
Roman kingdom via an Etruscan influence; simple speculation would have the phalanx 
system spread to Rome from Etruscan interactions with the Greeks in Campania.  Despite 
scholarly debate concerning the formation and structure of Rome’s hoplite organization, 
scholars unanimously accept that the hoplite system appears to be the earliest 
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(identifiable) organization of the Roman army, which remained in service well into the 
Republican period.
106
   
  The phalanx itself served the early Republic well, helping her expand her 
dominance over the Latin League, while winning significant victories against the Volsci, 
Aequi, and Etruscans.  The annual warfare of the Roman militia was generally successful, 
helping establish her position as the paramount power in Latium, although territorial 
gains remained rather insignificant. Yet Roman success cannot be simply attested to the 
phalanx, as other Italian people similarly utilized the Greek phalanx; rather Rome’s 
success derived from a combination of other factors such as Rome’s sheer advantage in 
manpower and its defensible location.
107
  Well suited to the socio-political conditions of 
pre-Roman Italy, the phalanx system proved invaluable to the Italian city states, as it 
molded an inexperienced citizen militia into a formidable mass of spears and shields.
108
  
Although warfare was an essential and annual part of Italian culture, conflict tended to be 
rather sporadic and minimal.  Raiding, rather than conquest, was the modus operandi of 
Italian armies prior to the fourth century.  Although Rome captured some towns and 
villages, these conflicts did not result in the capture and annexation of large cities until 
Veii.  Therefore, the main goal of warfare during this period was not to expand Rome’s 
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(or another Italian city’s) borders, but rather to expand its coffers.109  It is believed that 
early Rome’s vibrant economy was firmly due to a constant influx of war plunder.110    
  During this period, large armies tended to be mustered only on an ad hoc basis, 
generally only forming long enough to quell any immediate threat and then quickly 
dispersing.
111
  Although the prospect of plunder, combined with a militaristic culture, left 
no shortage of volunteers to participate in annual conflicts, the armies of sixth -fifth
 
century Italy were not comprised of professional soldiers.  The strength of the phalanx 
system was that it mitigated the negative effects of a citizen militia- particularly the lack 
of military training only cultivated through years of constant drilling; the average Italic 
warrior was a farmer with little or no weapons experience who was expected to pick up 
the skills as he went along.
112
  Thus the phalanx, proved an effective, albeit relatively 
simple, tactical formation.  Tactical demands on the average soldier were minimal, as 
they were merely expected to hold the line.
113
  Similarly tactically inexperienced consuls 
were less likely to hamper the military efficiency of armies, as once battle was joined 
there was little room for complicated manoeuvres; the phalanx is believed to have 
operated akin to a rugby scrum, with the bulk of the effort dedicated to pushing through 
the opponent’s line.    
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Perhaps the key feature of the phalanx system was the relatively negligible cost of 
waging war.  The close proximity of the men, combined with heavy armour, doubtlessly 
minimized causalities.  Furthermore, the weight of the armour meant that battle rarely 
exceeded a few hours.
114
  Of the causalities sustained, the majority came not from the 
combat itself, but occurred when one army retreated.  Yet even in retreat causalities were 
minimal, as members of the defeated army could throw down their shields, allowing them 
to outrun their opponents.
115
  The reduced cost of warfare proved an important facet of 
the phalanx system, especially considering that under this system the bulk of the fighting 
was conducted by the wealthiest individuals, the smallest yet most politically significant 
portion of the population.
116
    
However, by the third century BC Rome abandoned the phalanx in favour of the 
more versatile maniple system.
117
  Although the phalanx proved both cheap and ‘low 
impact’ in regards to cost, time, manpower, and experience, it did have some noticeable 
weaknesses.  In particular, the greatest weakness of the phalanx formation was its lack of 
mobility.  Phalanx armies were slow, encumbered masses that could only proceed as fast 
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as their front ranks allowed, that being the heavily-armoured aristocracy.  Furthermore, as 
the fundamental principle of phalanx warfare revolved around cohesion, directional 
changes could not be achieved with any haste.
118
  Another interesting occurrence born out 
of the phalanx formation was a tendency for lines to shift right as they marched.
119
  Yet 
for all these weaknesses the phalanx served the needs of the early Republic well, until the 
fourth century BC when an event or series of events convinced Rome of the need for a 
new military organization.  
Before attempting to isolate this galvanizing event in Roman military history, an 
analysis of the maniple system must first be provided in order to illustrate its tactical 
advantages over the phalanx formation.  The best description of the Roman maniple was 
offered by Polybius, which has led scholars to refer to the Roman manipular army as the 
“Polybian Legion.”  Stemming from the Latin word for a handful – manipulus, 
diminutive of manus (hand) - this system presupposed a significant change in military 
theory.  Rather than a single, unbroken line of hoplites, the maniple system organized the 
legion into a series of units of 120-160 men, ie, a handful.
120
  Soldiers were assigned to 
maniples based upon age and experience, rather than wealth.
121
  The youngest and 
therefore most inexperienced soldiers formed the hastati, men in their prime (presumably 
around 20-30) formed the principes, and Rome’s most veteran fighters formed the final 
maniple class, the triarii.
122
  Believed to resemble a checkerboard, the manipular army 
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would assemble itself in a staggard formation, with 30 maniples forming three lines of 
battle; 1200 hastati in the front, followed by a similar number of principes, with 600 
triarii bringing up the rear.
123
  Although these numbers could be increased according to 
tactical requirements, the number of triarii generally remained static.
124
  The 
checkerboard arrangement theoretically allowed for gaps between the maniples which 
were closed off by the following rank.  If the hastati were taking too much damage and 
needed to retreat they could simply fall back into the space behind them, protected by the 
principes, who then could move up to engage the enemy.
125
  Theoretically the hastati 
then slipped behind the triarii and reformed their line.  These legions were rounded out 
by the antefignani, the equites, socii, and lightly-armed skirmishers- velites- drawn up 
from the poorest sections of Roman society.
126
 
This organization created a legion which was both versatile and resilient.   With 
this new organization an enemy had to rout three separate lines of combatants, each more 
resilient than the previous one.  Not only did this permit Rome to fight effectively in 
longer engagements, but it also allowed for tactical diversity.  One particular example of 
the versatility of the new manipular army comes from the battle of Zama, where Scipio 
drew up the principes directly behind the hastati, rather than in the customary staggered 
formation; this allowed the velites, if engaged by Punic elephants, to quickly retreat to the 
back of the legion without causing any disorganization to the front lines.
127
  Another 
aspect of the manipular organization is that it allowed each maniple to move 
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independently of the legion if needed, allowing for an expanded itinerary of battlefield 
tactics.  This decentralized army, however, was double-sided, as more complex 
formations also required a more complex military hierarchy.  According to Polybius, each 
individual maniple was given two ordinum ductores (centurions), one to lead the left and 
another to lead the right.  If one centurion was killed, the other commander assumed 
command over the entire maniple.
128
  This was a rather brilliant innovation, as it ensured 
the chain of command was unbroken by the death of a single officer.  However, this 
whole system meant that warfare became more time intensive, as more training was 
required for each rank and certainly for the commanders.  For the most part, the days of 
farmers learning warfare on the march were quickly disappearing.   
The result of the maniple was a more versatile, yet intrinsically demanding 
organization.   Although the maniple provided Rome with an overseas empire, from 
Spain to Greece, the reasons behind its adoption in the fourth century BC remain unclear.  
Successful armies are rarely overhauled.  Despite a number of defeats, the Roman 
phalanx was largely successful, ensuring Roman dominance over the Latin League and 
the annexation of Veientian-held Etruria.  While the maniple system has been likened to a 
phalanx with joints, it nonetheless represents a drastic departure from previous military 
tradition.
129
  In order to locate the origins of the maniple and its introduction to the 
Roman legions, a catalyst for this event must first be found.  Two main events within the 
fourth century stand out as potential catalysts for Roman military reform: the Gallic sack 
of 390 BC and the Samnite Wars. 
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For either of these two events to have convinced the Romans to drop the phalanx 
in favour of the maniple, a few conditions must have been met.  The period in question 
probably saw a Roman defeat, or at least a hard-fought Pyrrhic victory.  Furthermore, 
Rome’s opponent(s) likely exploited the limitations of the Roman phalanx, illustrating its 
inherent weaknesses.  From the Greek sources, it is evident that the greatest phalanx 
armies were often handed startling defeats at the hands of lighter-armed, more mobile, 
armies fighting on uneven terrain.  The best illustration of this comes from Sphacteria, 
where the skirmishing attacks of the Athenians bested the elite Spartiate phalanx.  
Thucydides ascribes this victory to the speed of the lighter-armed Athenians and the 
rocky ground, which prevented a Spartan counter-attack.
130
  Thus, it is highly probable 
that the period leading up to the Roman adoption of the maniple included an occasion or 
two in which the Roman legion encountered these conditions; the manipular formation 
appears to be a direct response to the phalanx’s weaknesses.  In response to the defeat of 
the Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae, Polybius provided an explanation of the 
superiority of the maniple over the phalanx.  He believed that the maniple’s success was 
due primarily to its versatility, as each maniple was able to fight on any terrain, able to 
stand alone, and was able to quickly react to battlefield realities.
131
  
 Despite the logical assertions of Polybius, J. E. Lendon recently argued that the 
maniple was actually inferior to the phalanx.  He saw the maniple, with its reduced 
frontage, multitude of moving parts, and the receding line of battle, as an organization 
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which placed the Romans at a general disadvantage.
132
  He further elaborates that the 
reason the Romans adopted the maniple was because it made the Roman soldier braver, 
thus overcoming its inherent disadvantages.    This was because the maniple system, 
according to Lendon, was not adapted to cope with rocky terrain, nor to deal with 
enemies who employed irregular tactics, but because it appealed to the Roman cult of 
virtus.
133
  He argues that this is why the Romans and Romans alone adopted the maniple, 
explaining why the maniple was not speedily adopted by other nations.  If Lendon’s 
theory is correct, identifying a specific time-period for the adoption of the maniple 
becomes impossible, as it was the result of centuries of conflict between the Roman 
desire for individual distinction and the rigidity of the foreign phalanx.  Not only does 
this suggest that the evolution of the manipular organization started with the adoption of 
the Greek phalanx, but also implies that it was a uniquely Roman formation.
134
  The 
justification for his theory however, proves strained, as the entirety of this theory rests 
upon a perception that the maniple would have been adopted by other nations if it was as 
superior as Polybius implies. Yet, the majority of Rome’s enemies, quite simply, were 
not given enough time to adopt the maniple, after being exposed to it.  Furthermore, these 
tribes simply lacked the social and political institutions required to institute such a 
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complex military organization.  Regardless, there are clear indications of foreign nations 
attempting to mimic Roman styles.  Polybius records 5000 Seleucid infantry armed and 
trained in the Roman manner under Antiochus IV.
135
  Even Hannibal attempted to adopt 
some Roman military practices while campaigning in Italy.
136
  Yet these powers were 
unable to adopt Roman tactics due to their reliance on foreign soldiers, which made up 
the majority of their armies. 
Lendon’s argument perhaps is correct in that the maniple was not the strongest 
military formation, as the phalanx could still beat it in favourable conditions.  It was, 
however, the most tactically versatile, allowing Roman armies to operate anywhere, 
against any enemies, without major overhauls.  Ultimately, the Romans that Lendon 
envisions were so enslaved to cultural conditions that they ignored tactical prudence and 
simply got lucky; Lendon’s argument suggests that Rome adopted an inferior military 
formation solely because it appealed to Roman notions of virtue, the success of the 
maniple in uneven terrain being a unforeseen benefit.  Rome would have never conquered 
such a large empire had it been this apathetic to military science.  Thus Lendon’s 
emphasis on social pressures should be rejected in favour of Polybius; the Romans 
adopted the maniple in response to the changing military and geographic realities of Italy. 
One drastic challenge to the Roman military establishment arose out of the Gallic 
sack of Rome in 390 BC.  While the conditions which prompted it remain a source of 
scholarly discussion, in 390 the Gallic Senones under the leadership of Brennus invaded 
Roman lands.  Following the disastrous defeat of the Roman legions at the river Allia, 
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Brennus laid siege to Rome, eventually obtaining a ransom of one thousand pounds of 
gold from the Roman senate.
137
  It is during this payout that Brennus is reported to have 
thrown his sword on the scale, uttering the infamous statement “vae victis!”138  The 
classical sources describe this incident as being a catastrophe akin to that of Cannae.   
According to Diodorus, the larger Roman army, comprised of all the young men of 
Rome, was annihilated by the Gauls at the mouth of the Allia.
139
  The Gauls then 
continued their massacre as the Romans attempted to flee across the Tiber, many 
drowning in the river.  Livy, however, provides a different version.  In Livy’s rendition, 
the Gauls outnumbered the Romans greatly and the Romans were forced to use their 
reserves to stretch their line out in order to match the Gallic line.
140
  The less experienced 
Roman reserves then panicked at the number and fearsome nature of their enemy and ran.  
This resulted in a full retreat, which the Gauls had precipitated without killing a single 
man in combat.  Like Diodorus, Livy agrees that the majority of Roman causalities 
sustained were caused by men drowning in the Tiber and those cut down from behind;
 
doubtlessly, more fell due to their stampeding fellow Romans than to the blades of the 
Gauls.
 141
  The majority of Roman troops in Livy’s version make it safely to Veii.   
Accepting Livy’s account of the Battle of the Allia, a more robust, more human, 
history is offered.  This understanding helps explain much of the mythos circulating 
around this event.  Counter to the claims of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rome was 
certainly not burned to a crisp following the defeat of her legions.
142
  Archaeological 
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studies of Rome have uncovered little evidence of any cataclysmic event from this 
period.
143
  Even the ancient authors have suggested that they may have exaggerated the 
nature of the Gallic sack.  According to Diodorus, the year following the Gallic 
catastrophe, the Romans were able to defeat simultaneous invasions by the Aequi, Volsci, 
and Etruscans.
144
  The following year, Rome invaded Etruria, capturing the Tarquinian 
towns of Cortuosia and Contenebra.
145
  Not only was the Roman ability to conduct 
warfare unhampered by the Gallic sack, but her population likewise appears to have 
emerged relatively unscathed.  Less than a decade later, Roman colonies were established 
at Sutrium, Nepet, and perhaps even Sardinia.
146
  Thus it is probably safe to assume the 
ancient authors were exaggerating when they spoke of the Celts putting the city to the 
sword.
147
   
Rome’s “miraculous recovery” from this event also proves unremarkable, as 
Rome and her legions seem to have escaped this incident with little more than hurt pride 
and dwindled coffers.
148
   Yet this in itself explains the contrary assertions by Diodorus 
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and Dionysius, as the destruction of Rome’s legions and the destruction of Rome herself 
were probably preferable to the reality: that the Roman forces had routed quickly and 
promptly fled to Veii, leaving Rome herself open to the depredations of their barbarian 
opponents.  Not only had the Roman legions fled the field, but Rome herself was forced 
to pay off the barbarian invaders.  This would have been scandalous to the Roman 
psyche, as it was completely contradictory to the Roman militaristic ethos, in the end it 
had been gold and not steel which had redeemed the native land.
149
   
 Since the Battle of Allia and the entire Gallic sack is generally believed to have 
involved little actual fighting, it appears an unlikely juncture for military reforms.  There 
was little reason for the Romans to abandon the phalanx at this juncture, as the Gauls 
neither outmanoeuvred the Romans, nor did they have superior military technology.  In 
successive conflicts with Cisalpine Gallic tribes, Rome’s legions repeatedly proved their 
pre-eminence, besting their Celtic foes apparently at will.  
 It has also been suggested that the open-order formation of the Celts inspired the 
Romans to adopt the maniple- perhaps in 367 amidst the supposed “Camillan Reforms.”  
Yet these assertions are dubious, as the Gallic tribes probably fought in a similar manner 
to the Italians- despite the classical descriptions of them as proto-typical sword-wielding 
barbarians.
150
  One of the more trustworthy accounts of Gallic warfare is offered by 
Julius Caesar, in his Commentarii de Bello Gallico, which describes Gallic forces 
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fighting in a phalanx and being highly organized.
151
  Admittedly there is a temporal and 
geographical separation between the Gauls of Caesar and those of Camillus, but Caesar’s 
work actually predates Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita by decades.  
  Thus, the fleeting encounters with the Senones simply lacked enough impact to 
make the Romans alter their entire military structure.  While Romano-Gallic interactions 
in the fourth century BC doubtlessly made the Romans rethink their defences, they 
simply were not damaging enough to make Rome overhaul her generally victorious 
legions.          
What the impact of the Gallic sack lacked in its lasting effects and duration, the 
Samnite wars of the late fourth century provided.  These wars were as indecisive as they 
were brutal.  During the course of these wars, Rome suffered crippling defeats, 
inconclusive campaigns, had allies turn against them, and saw the entirety of Italy unite 
against her.  Furthermore, this colossal struggle was unlike any other previous conflict in 
Roman history in that it was sustained warfare against a cohesive and organized 
opponent.
152
  Not only was Rome dealt a series of military defeats, but she was frustrated 
by years of Jurgurthine-styled warfare as Roman successes did little to curtail the 
recalcitrant Samnites.
153
 Spanning over four decades, this conflict, by its very nature, 
seems to be an apt context for a period of military overhauls.     
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Although no specific date is offered by the primary sources, which will be 
discussed in depth a little later, 311 BC is seen by many scholars as being the most 
plausible date for the adoption of the maniple formation.  In 311, the Republic increased 
the number of military tribunes from 3 per legion to 6 per legion, with 4 of them being 
elected by the popular assembly.
154
  This increase in military bureaucracy probably 
reflects a larger overhaul in Rome’s military.  Pat Southern has suggested that this date 
also saw the increase in Rome’s annual levy from 2 to 4 legions, distrusting Livy’s 
assertion that this had already occurred by 340 BC.
155
  Other scholars, such as Cornell, 
have seen this as an indication of more systemic alterations, namely the adoption of the 
maniple system.
156
  This theory has merit, as the more complex maniple system 
demanded an expanded military command structure.  If this is to be believed, the increase 
in military tribunes could have meant that each legion would have had 6 tribunes, 2 per 
manipular line.
157
  This has agreeable symmetry with later descriptions of manipular 
organization, as Polybius stated that every individual maniple had two commanders.
158
  
Not only is there literary support for military reforms around 311, but contextual support 
as well.  In particular, prior to 311, Roman martial fortunes were bleak, with the Samnites 
winning the majority of the engagements.  Roman legions in 315 BC, seeking redress for 
the moral outrages inflicted upon them at the Caudine Forks, were again bested by a 
Samnite force, this time being dealt a more tangible defeat at Lautulae.  Following the 
reforms of 311, the Roman army slowly began to build momentum, eventually forcing a 
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favourable peace with the Samnites in 304 BC.  This is not to say that Roman successes 
after 311 were entirely due to the adoption of the maniple system, merely that the events 
prior established a longstanding period of setbacks and disappointments which could 
have instigated military reforms. 
    Literary evidence concerning the formal adoption of the maniple system is 
rather sparse.  This is primarily due to the misunderstanding on the account of the ancient 
authors that the maniple system must have been adopted simultaneously with the javelin 
and oblong shield.  References to the manipular organization itself are only offered by 
Plutarch, Diodorus, and Livy.  Each of these authors offers a different date for the 
adoption of the maniple.  Plutarch claimed the maniple originated with Romulus, which 
despite having support from the Ineditum Vaticanum, is clearly an absurd anachronism.
159
  
A more reasonable date is provided by Livy, who dates the adoption of the maniple 
around the same time as the introduction of the stipendium.
160
  This dating suggests that 
the maniple evolved during the Roman siege of Veii in 406 BC.  In his Commentary on 
Livy, Oakley disputed this dating- citing a failure of collaboration with any other ancient 
source- instead suggesting that the maniple system had to evolve sometime after 340.
161
  
Furthermore, Livy discredits himself by consistently retrojecting the maniple and cohort 
into his narratives of events prior to 406.
162
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A more amply attested tradition is that the maniple evolved during the alleged 
Camillan reforms of the army.  This view suggests that Camillus instituted the maniple 
organization in response to Gallic incursions in 367 BC.  Yet this proves unsubstantiated, 
as no classical source directly attributes the maniple system to Camillus; although some 
sources, particularly Plutarch’s Life of Camillus, have been used to support a Camillan 
reform, these references refer only to the maniple’s associated weaponry and not the 
organization itself.  One modern adherent of  the Camillan reform theory, E. T. Salmon, 
argued that Livy’s dating of the maniple to around 406 BC complements Plutarch’s 
passage attributing the scutum to Camillus in 367.
163
  This argument, however, is rather 
stretched and is generally refuted by most scholars.
164
  The only tenable suggestion 
offered by the literary sources for the adaptation of the maniple comes from Diodorus 
Siculus, who stated that the Romans directly adopted the maniple system from the 
Samnites.
165
   
The literary evidence, although sparse, seems to support the idea that the maniple 
evolved during the Samnite Wars.  Similarly, most scholars tend to agree that the Roman 
adoption of the maniple originated during the Samnite Wars.  Southern argued that the 
Samnite Wars, by necessity, required some form of military adaptation, as the Samnites 
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were hill fighters who were loath to leave their highland fortresses.
166
  While this 
statement has validity, especially considering the relative abundance of Samnite hill-fort 
ruins, some scholars still have their reservations.  John Rich, in particular, disagrees with 
a Samnite genesis, simply on the grounds that he doesn’t believe that the Romans would 
have marched on Samnium with a hoplite army.
167
   This assertion however, lacks 
historical credence, for Greek phalanx armies reached as far as India.  Furthermore, 
Rich’s comment assumes that Rome had foreknowledge of the style and type of warfare 
in which it was going to be engaged in during the Samnite Wars; it could be argued that 
Rome received its first lesson in mountain fighting at the Caudine Forks.   
With the aforementioned exceptions, the majority of scholars tend to agree that 
the maniple was adopted sometime during the course of the Samnite Wars, probably 
around 311.   While the highland warfare of the Samnites spurred the Romans to 
reorganize their legions, the maniple itself is of unknown origins.  Whether or not the 
maniple was a Roman invention or adoption remains a source of scholarly discussion.  
Unfortunately, the literary sources provide little insight into this manner.  Cicero’s de 
Oratore 2.80.325 has been suggested by some to imply that the Samnites used a maniple-
like formation, well suited to the geographical realities of their mountainous dwellings.
168
  
This passage, however, is problematic, as it is hard to distinguish which Samnites Cicero 
was speaking about, the ethnic grouping or the later gladiators.
169
  Furthermore, the 
nature of this passage offers little real insight and is often stretched to its extremes to 
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support the concept of a Samnite maniple.  The literary tradition thus fails to offer any 
compelling evidence of a Samnite maniple.   
Outside the historical record, archaeological evidence from Samnium and 
Samnite-occupied regions often illustrates Samnites armed in the hoplite manner.  This 
however, doesn’t imply that the Samnites fought in a phalanx, as both the geographical 
and social factors of Samnium dictated that the Samnites most certainly did not rely 
solely on the Greek phalanx.
170
  The Certosa Situla offers the only tangible evidence that 
the maniple existed prior to Rome’s adoption of it in the fourth century BC.  Uncovered 
near modern Bologna, this situla displays a series of differently clad warriors in 
succession, strongly suggestive of acies (battle lines).  Interestingly, the front two lines of 
warriors are depicted carrying an oblong shield, with the final line wielding a round 
shield, which implies the presence of a pre-Roman maniple.
171
  This Etruscan situla dates 
to around 480-490 BC and shows a mixing of Hellenistic and Oriental features, typical of 
Etruscan art, but also illustrates a connection to other Italian societies.
172
  In particular, 
the second and third rows of warriors on the situla contain individuals wearing broad-
brimmed hats which closely resemble that of the Vestini Capestrano Warrior, which dates 
to the later sixth century BC.   Any extrapolation of this evidence proves extremely 
difficult, however, as it is impossible to determine if this organization was influenced by 
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the Vestini, or the Vestini by the Etruscans, nor is it possible to determine the ethnicity of 
the warriors depicted.
173
  Yet if this vessel is indeed indicative of an Italian proto-maniple 
then it seems probable that other Safin- cultures had knowledge of it.
174
  Rawson 
champions this view, suggesting that it stands to reason that the Italians developed and 
used the manipular organization long before Rome herself adopted it.
175
  
  Salmon believed that Livy was probably correct in implying that a Samnite army 
of the Second Samnite War closely resembled a Roman one, with them even being 
organized into legions.
176
  While this may be true, due to the repetition and ease with 
which Livy applies Roman terminology to non-Roman armies, he must be ignored as a 
source on army organization; he was probably correct in stating that the Samnites fought 
in maniples, but he immediately contradicted himself by claiming that they also had 
cohorts of 400 men.
177
  It is extremely unlikely that the Samnites also organized their 
manipular armies into three lines of hastati, principes, and triarii.
178
   With the available 
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evidence, the safest assertion is that the Roman maniple was a uniquely Roman invention 
inspired by pre-existing Italic organizations.  While it is impossible to determine if the 
Romans adopted the maniple directly from the Samnites, it can be safely assumed that it 
was adopted due to Samnite influences sometime during the Samnite Wars of the fourth 
century BC. 
Having concluded that the Roman adoption of the maniple system occurred 
sometime within the context of the Samnite Wars, the next logical step is to consider the 
Roman adoption of the scutum and pilum. Both of these armaments, which radically 
altered the shape and tactics of the Roman legion, are often described by the ancient 
sources as being of a similarly Samnite origin.   This ancient tradition of ascribing the 
pilum and scutum to the Samnites is best summarized by the Ineditum Vaticanum, which 
states:   
 This is what the Romans are like… With those who make   
 war on us we agree to fight on their terms, and when it comes   
 to foreign practices we surpass those who have long been used  
 to them.  For the Tyrrhenians used to make war on us with   
 bronze shields and fighting in phalanx formation… and we,   
 changing our armament and replacing it with theirs… were   
 victorious… Similarly the Samnite shield was not part of   
 our national equipment, nor did we have javelins, but fought   
 with round shields and  spears… But when we found ourselves  
 at war with the Samnites we armed ourselves with their oblong  
 shields and javelins.
179
 
Similar statements are offered by other classical authors, such as Diodorus, Sallust, 
Eusebius, and Athenaeus.
180
  Yet, despite the repetition of these statements within the 
classical sources, contemporary scholars tend to dismiss these claims as being 
                                                             
    
179
Edited by H. von. Arnim, “Ineditum Vaticanum,” Hermes 27 (1892): 118-30.  Translation by 
Tim Cornell, the Beginnings of Rome, 170. 
    
180
Diod. XXIII:2:6: Sal. Cat. LI:37-38: Ath. Deip. VI: 106: Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica , 
X:6: Eusebius even names Itanus, a Samnite, as the inventor of the oblong shield. 
60 
 
fabrications.  This scholarly scorn is due primarily to the rhetorical and propagandist 
form in which this information is delivered; a manifestation of the Latin utterance, fas est 
et ab hoste doceri.
181
 
 Scholars are correct to view these statements with suspicion, as learning 
from their enemies was a hallmark of Roman national pride.  Propagandist overtones, 
however, are simply not enough to justify a complete dismissal of these statements, as 
Salmon does.
182
  There is absolutely no reason to doubt the information given, as this 
propaganda was often based on fact; Rome is  indeed believed to have adopted phalanx 
warfare from the Etruscans, as it is generally accepted that siege warfare spread to Rome 
via the Greeks.  Even in the later Republic, Rome often adopted the military practices of 
other civilizations, as is the case of Marius who formed his “Marian Mules” based on the 
infantry of Philip of Macedon.
183
  Thus, aside from the rhetoric, there appears little 
reason to doubt the validity of these statements.  What must be disregarded, however, is 
the natural conclusion of these statements: that Rome always perfected what they 
adopted, allowing them to beat their enemies at their own game.  There is little evidence 
supporting the notion that the Roman phalanx was superior to the Etruscan phalanx, or 
that the Roman use of the scutum and\or pilum was superior to that of the Samnites.  The 
passages of Sallust and Diodorus are recorded in the form of discussions during the onset 
of the Punic Wars, in which a Carthaginian reminds a Roman that they are nautically 
superior to Rome.  To this statement, the Roman retorts that the Carthaginians would be 
                                                             
    
181
Ovid, Met. VI.428: “It is righteous to learn from one’s enemy.” Translation by author.   
    
182
Salmon, 107.   
    
183
Antonio Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 21.  
61 
 
wise to avoid teaching Rome, as they are pupils who always outstrip their masters.
184
  If 
one ignores the underlying notion of Roman superiority, it may be possible to salvage 
these annalistic traditions.
185
 
 The earliest possible date for the Roman adoption of the oblong shield is 
offered by Livy, who dates the adoption of the scutum alongside the creation of the 
stipendiarii during the siege of Veii.
186
  Livy’s dating has received some support from 
some contemporary scholars, namely Lawrence Keppie, who supported the Livian dating 
for the adoption of the scutum, although he rejects the notion that the adoption of the 
shield coincided with the adoption of the maniple.
187
  Aside from the support of Keppie, 
Livy’s dating nonetheless proves problematic, as it is not supported by any other classical 
source.  Diodorus refers to Manlius Capitolinus being armed with a θυρεός in 390 
(Roman oblong shield) - however, as this event is legendary it is highly suspect.
188
  
(Diodorus would later directly credit the adoption of the scutum to the Samnites).  
Furthermore, Livy himself shows a pervasive ignorance (or at least a contemptuous 
disinterest) in Roman military tactics; this is illustrated by the systemic inaccuracies and 
anachronisms regarding his descriptions of early Roman military structure. 
 A more tenable alternative is offered by Plutarch who ascribed the scutum 
to the dictatorship of Camillus during the Gallic campaign of 367.  
 Knowing that the prowess of the barbarians lay chiefly in their  
 swords, which they plied in true barbaric fashion, and with no skill   
 at all, in mere slashing blows at head and shoulders, he had helmets  
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  forged for most of his men which were all iron and smooth of  
 surface, that the enemy's swords might slip off from them or be  
 shattered by them. He also had the long shields of his men rimmed  
  round with bronze, since their wood could not of itself ward off the 
 enemy's blows. The soldiers themselves he trained to use their long  
 javelins like spears, — to thrust them under the enemy's swords   
 and catch the downward strokes upon them
189
 
Rawson, however, disagreed with this dating, as well as the validity of the overarching 
‘Camillan reforms.’  According to her, these passages, the accuracy of which is suspect, 
argue towards a temporary adoption of the oblong shield, rather than a permanent 
introduction.
190
  She is correct to question this interpretation of Plutarch, as all this 
passage implies is that Camillus merely added metal edging to a pre-existing shield.  
Assuming that the shield in question is indeed an early scutum, the addition of copper-
rims to the shield must have been the temporary measure.  The scutum recovered at Kasr-
el-Harit, Egypt, which is of uncertain dating but probably from the first century, clearly 
lacks metal edging.
191
  While this passage may outline an interesting experiment with 
Roman armaments, it does not denote any widespread Roman adoption of the oblong 
shield.  At best Plutarch’s comments, which are themselves suspect, merely imply that 
the scutum was known to the Romans by 367. 
   The Roman rhetorical tradition which attributes the oblong shield to the 
Samnites is espoused by Diodorus, Athenaeus, Sallust, Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria, 
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and the Ineditum Vaticanum.
192
  According to this tradition, the scutum was adopted 
sometime during the Samnite Wars of the late fourth
 
- early third century.  This theory is 
immediately the most plausible; as the literary and archaeological record clearly 
illustrates that the Samnites were in possession of such an oblong shield during this 
period.  Livy claimed that the Samnites wielded a rectangular shield which was broader 
on the top than it was on the bottom.
193
  Yet Livy’s trapezoidal Samnite shield is not 
supported by any other classical source and is not well-attested in the archaeological 
record.  Perhaps here Livy confused the armaments of Samnite gladiators with that of the 
Samnite proper, akin to his comments concerning the Samnites wearing only one 
greave.
194
  Yet Livy’s trapezoidal shield cannot yet be dismissed, as an Apulian terracotta 
statue of Minerva is shown wielding a similar shield, which Sekunda believes would not 
be the case if the shield was only a gladiatorial shield.
195
  While he fails to substantiate 
this claim, his argument seems based on the later association of Minerva with warfare; as 
a goddess of war it seems more appropriate to have her holding a military armament, 
rather than a gladiatorial one.  Yet there is nothing to imply that this is the case, as the 
main festival of Minerva, the quinquatrus, involved four days of gladiatorial combat.
196
  
Regardless of the exact shape of the Samnite shield, that they wielded an oblong shield 
appears unquestionable.  Even the indirect historical tradition of Dionysius identifies the 
Samnites with an oblong shield.  Although Dionysius’s narrative fails to confirm or deny 
Livy’s trapezoidal shield, among the Italian and Greek armies assembled at Asculum, 
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only the Samnites are mentioned using the oblong shield, further hinting at the 
uniqueness of the Samnite shield.
197
  Further evidence is offered by the Esquiline fresco, 
c.200 BC, which depicts scuta wielding-Samnites fighting Roman forces.
198
  While no 
archaeological remains of the Samnite scutum have been discovered, this is not 
concerning given that shields are exceptionally rare in archaeological finds.  This is due 
not only to the disintegration of the wooden components, but also because the iron-
deprived Samnites doubtlessly would have recycled any iron parts.  Furthermore, even 
though the shield was among the most valuable spoils of war, they were not included in 
warrior burials and no examples have been recovered from temple sanctuaries.
199
   
 Another problematic challenge to the Samnite scutum comes from the 
pottery record.  The entirety of extant pottery which depicts armed Samnites does not 
depict the oblong shield, but almost always depicts the aspis (round hoplite shield).  
Similarly, most Samnite tomb paintings display Samnite warriors wielding a hoplite 
shield rather than a scutum.  These depictions, however, should be viewed with suspicion 
as they were commissioned by the Hellenophilic Samnite elite and were attempting to 
mimic koine styles.
200
  Therefore, these artifacts are not attempting to convey the normal 
armament of the average Samnite, but rather were portraying them in the more heroic 
style of the Greeks.   Although some Samnites probably did wield the aspis, given the 
unanimous agreement within the literary sources, combined with indirect archaeological 
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evidence, there is no reason to doubt the existence of the oblong Samnite shield by the 
fourth century BC.    
    While contemporary scholars accept that the Samnites utilized an oblong 
shield, they nonetheless remain heavily divided on whether or not the Roman scutum was 
adopted due to Samnite influence or Samnite models.  Aside from the theories offered by 
the primary sources, scholars have suggested a number of alternatives.  Santosuosso 
argued that the scutum was adopted during the Latin Wars of the fourth century, rather 
than during the Samnite Wars.
201
  On the other hand, Salmon and others have argued that 
the scutum was actually a pan-Italic armament, utilized not only by Osco-Umbrian tribes, 
but also by the Etruscans.
202
  Under this model, Diodorus’s claim that the Romans 
originally used the rectangular shield, but abandoned it in favour of the Greek aspis, may 
hold some truth.
203
  Depictions of the Salii upon a Roman agate intaglio, at the 
Archaeological Museum of Florence, show them carrying the sacred ancilia- oblong, 
figure-eight shields.
204
  Although these shields were religious relics for purely ceremonial 
purpose, the ancilia may nonetheless reflect the military armaments of early Italy.  
According to both Macrobius and Servius, the order of the Salii, charged with the 
protection of the ancilia, had existed in other Italic cities prior to Rome.
205
  These Italic 
Salii were probably similarly tasked with protecting and maintaining their own ancilia.  
While this evidence is merely anecdotal and shouldn’t be stressed too far, it does suggest 
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that oblong shields may have been known to Romans as early as the seventh century 
BC.
206
                            
 Assuming Diodorus was correct in asserting that the Sabine oblong shield 
was abandoned in favour of the Etruscan clipeus, it makes sense in terms of a gradual 
progression rather than as a wholesale adoption.  From the founding of Rome well into 
the late Republic, each soldier was responsible for providing his own armaments.   
Therefore, Italian armies could not have been as homogenous as the sources describe, and 
were probably comprised of a number of differently armed soldiers, perhaps only the 
wealthiest citizens being able to arm themselves with any uniformity.  Italian 
archaeological digs have supported this view, as they have uncovered a wide range of 
weaponry from this period, which is best exemplified by the grave stele of Aule Feluske 
of Vetulonia, c.seventh century BC, who is depicted wearing a Greek helmet and shield, 
but wielding a two-sided axe.  Furthermore, spears discovered in central and southern 
Italy, dating from the seventh to fourth centuries BC, have shown an incredible variation 
in the form and types used within a given region.
207
  Since the Roman government would 
not start supplying its troops with uniform armaments for centuries, any adoption of new 
weaponry must have been a decentralized and drawn-out affair.  It should be safe 
therefore, to assume that the adoption of the clipeus and scutum did not occur instantly, 
complete overhauls of Roman military armaments, but rather were the embodiment of 
underlying cultural and political influences.  Under this premise, the Roman elites, 
having come into contact with the Etruscan-Greek hoplites, began to emulate these styles 
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of armaments.  Thus the shift was slow, as individual Roman citizens embraced this new 
military tradition, which was doubtlessly amplified by class struggle.       
 Although the clipeus was the favoured shield prior to the fourth century, 
Roman contact with the Samnites doubtlessly helped shift popular opinion (back) 
towards the scutum or a proto-scutum.  The scutum, while formally abandoned for the 
rounder clipeus, may have remained in continual use amongst the Roman legions, 
doubtlessly amongst the poorer factions.  Arising from this is a slightly less uniform, but 
more period- appropriate Roman militia, where each soldier was expected to arm himself, 
and armaments were family heirlooms.
208
  Yet something during the fourth century must 
have shifted popular preference back to the scutum.  Simple speculation would attribute 
this to the military success of the Osco-Samnites as opposed to the relative decay of the 
Greek city-states of Magna Graecia in the fourth century.  Whatever factors had initiated 
the change in popular preference back to the scutum, this movement reached its climax 
during the Samnite Wars.  Not only did the martial prowess of the Samnites impress the 
Romans, but the very presence of the Samnite oblong shield probably helped facilitate the 
Roman re-adoption of it. Of all the ancient armaments that were taken as spoils of war, 
the shield was paramount, holding special significance in the Mediterranean world.  It is 
safe to assume, therefore, that during the Samnite Wars, the scutum became more and 
more prevalent within Roman society, as captured Samnite shields gradually replaced the 
Etruscan aspis within Roman public places.  Livy himself addresses this influx of 
Samnite arms, stating:  
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 Papirius dedicated the temple of Quirinus…  adorning it with the  
 spoils of the enemy, of these there was such a great quantity that  
 not only were the temple and the Forum bedecked with them, but  
 they were distributed also amongst the allies and the neighbouring  
 colonies for the decoration of their temples and public squares.
209
  
Michael Burns takes this further, arguing that southern Italian depictions of the “returning 
warrior” are often set in a more domestic context, suggesting that individual warriors 
often hung victory spoils in their house as symbols of personal valour.
210
  This influx of 
Samnite armaments also coincided with the expansion of the Roman army from 2 to 4 
legions in 311.
211
  Thus the Roman army was doubling at a time when the previous 
legions at Caudine had been forced to surrender their entire panoply- perhaps the true 
tragedy of this event.  It stands to reason then, that many of the armaments for the 
expanded Roman militia were spoils of war.  Thus the majority of these new recruits 
probably took up the shield of the Samnites, which was probably not much different from 
the one that the Romans previously used.  While the scutum may or may not have been of 
Samnite origin, it can be safely assumed that Roman-Samnite interactions helped 
accelerate the (re)introduction of the scutum into the Roman panoply by helping shift 
popular conception away from the Etruscan\Greek aspis; they would also expedite this 
process by providing the expanding Roman legions with shields directly through the 
spoils of victory.
212
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 The tactical advantages of the rectangular scutum over the round clipeus are 
rather minor.  Unlike the smaller and lighter Argive shields, the “Sabine” scutum was 
heavy and unwieldy.
213
  This at first seems enigmatic, as the Romans instituted the 
cumbersome scutum at a period in which they were emphasising mobility, i.e. the 
maniple. While the larger armament made soldiers braver, the true strength of the 
restrictive shield was that it offered superior protection against projectiles.  Not only did 
the scutum fully envelop a crouching soldier, it also allowed entire units to interlock their 
shields, providing a nearly impenetrable wall to repel missile attacks- later being further 
refined into the testudo formation.
214
  This not only explains the longevity of the Roman 
scutum, but further reinforces the theory that it was adopted during the Samnite Wars, as 
the highland Samnites were masters of missile combat.
215
   
 The last of the attested ‘Samnite borrowings’ is that of the Roman pilum.  
Embraced by the classical sources of Sallust and the Ineditum Vaticanum, one rhetorical 
tradition has the pilum coming to Rome via the Samnites sometime during the Samnite 
Wars.
216
  This tradition however, is not as prevalent among the extant literary sources as 
that of the Samnite scutum: Diodorus notably made no mention of a Samnite pilum, and 
Atheneaus actually denied this claim, believing the pilum to be of Iberian stock.
217
  Not 
all classical sources, however, shared Atheneaus’s objections.  The Greek word for the 
Samnites, Saunitai, led Festus to believe that their name derived from the Greek saunion, 
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meaning javelin.
218
  Although Salmon dismissed this as being a crude piece of popular 
etymology, there may yet be some truth to this statement.
219
  Strabo, who is rather 
pragmatic when discussing such things, stated that the term Saunitai had little to do with 
a genealogical association, but was due to another reason.
220
  While Strabo fails to 
identify the root of the Greek terminology, there appears no rational reason to dismiss 
Festus’s claim that the Greek name for the Samnites derived from their usage of javelins.  
A Samnite-minted fractional coin from c.325 proves that this etymology was well-known 
in the fourth century.  The coin has a laurel wreath with a javelin head on one side, while 
the reverse depicts a women’s head with the word ∑AYNITAN, which is translated “of 
the Saunitai” in the Doric dialect of Tarentum.221  It appears that the connotation of 
Samnites as javelineers was not simply the invention of later classical historians.  
Although the Greek name for Samnites may derive from their preference for javelins, this 
offers little support for the claim that Rome adopted the pilum from the Samnites.   
  The Samnite origin theory is not the only one offered by the classical 
sources, as Atheneaus believed the pilum to be of Punic\Iberian origin.
222
 Another 
plausible alternative suggested by classical historians is that the pilum was a uniquely 
Roman invention.  Servius firmly believed this, stating: “pilum proprie est hasta 
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Romana, ut gaesa Gallorum, sarissae Macedonum.”223  To a lesser extent, Lucan would 
also state this by making the pilum an embodiment of Roman nationalism.
224
      
 Contemporary scholars remain as heavily divided on the pilum’s origins, as 
were the classical authors.  Support for a Camillan\Gallic origin comes from the work of 
Salmon and Keppie, who rely primarily on the statements of Livy and Plutarch.
225
 These 
studies however, are rather dated and are predicated on the simultaneous adoption of the 
maniple, scutum, and pilum. In recent years, however, the general consensus amongst 
historians has shifted away from the Camillan-Gallic dating in favour of a later date of 
adoption.
226
  Outside of the Samnite tradition, this only leaves one viable alternative, the 
Punic wars.  Polybius makes it rather clear that the Roman army by the period of the 
Second Punic War not only had pila, but two distinct forms of it.
227
  From this it has been 
argued that the pilum could have arisen out of the Roman-Carthaginian interactions 
during the First Punic War.  It is doubtful however, that the pilum was of Carthaginian 
manufacture, but more likely was the armament of ethnic troops under their employ.  
Recently, Louis Rawlings has argued that the pilum probably spread to Rome via 
Carthaginian-employed Iberian mercenaries during the First Punic War.
228
  While this is 
supported by Athenaeus, Rawlings concedes that Romans were probably experimenting 
with the pilum as early as the fourth century.
229
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 With the conflicting testimonies within the literary tradition, contemporary 
historians have turned to archaeological evidence to locate the pilum’s dubious origins.  
Unfortunately the archaeological record has proven similarly inconclusive.  Early forms 
of proto-pila have been positivity identified among various Etruscan tombs, including 
both depictions on wall-frescoes, as well as physical finds.  Alternatively, evidence from 
graves in southern Italy and Spain has lent support for a Samnite or Iberian origin, 
respectively.
230
  For example, a Lucianan wall fresco from Paestum depicts a Samnite 
wielding a javelin which bears a striking resemblance to the Roman pilum.
231
  The Gallic 
gestum, Etruscan telum, Iberian phalarica, Greek saunter, the Osci aclis, and the Samnite 
veru have all been suggested as being the proto-pilum, albeit some more convincingly 
than others.  Thus the pilum’s origins remains hopelessly convoluted.  The safest 
conclusion that can be gleaned from this evidence is to echo the statements of Coulston 
by stating that the pilum was probably a Roman innovation based on Etruscan, Samnite, 
Gallic, and Spanish influences.
232
    
 As the true origin of the pilum remains shrouded in obscurity, it is 
impossible to make any claims of it having any significant Samnite influence.  The 
discussion of the pilum’s origins however, often overshadows a larger and much more 
significant process: the Roman adoption of missile warfare.  While Roman armies had 
always utilized some form of missile combat, under the Servian system it was generally 
monopolized by the lower classes who could not afford to arm themselves in hoplite 
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panoply; the first three classes were solely designed for hand-to-hand combat, lacking 
any significant projectile to throw.  At some unknown point in Rome’s history, her heavy 
infantry were completely overhauled, with missile combat becoming the new modus 
operandi of Roman forces.  By the period of Julius Caesar, every legionnaire carried two 
pila into battle, throwing them directly prior to engagement in hand-to-hand combat.  
This reliance upon missile combat remained firmly entrenched within the Roman military 
psyche well into the later Empire.  Yet the adoption of missile combat is rarely discussed 
amongst historians, who far too often and rather erroneously tend to make it synonymous 
with the adoption of the overall maniple system.  Many scholars have argued that the 
adoption of missile combat was predicated on the open-air formations of the maniple 
system.
233
  While these statements have some validity, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the maniple system could not have preceded the adoption of missile combat.  Recent 
studies have even shown that the phalanx employed by Italic city-states was substantially 
more versatile and open than that of its Greek-counterparts.
234
  Livy himself illustrated 
that the maniple was not synonymous with missile combat, as he explained that in the 
earliest maniples only twenty men per maniple of hastati would carry the javelin.
235
  The 
majority of these hastati were armed similarly to the principes, lacking any implied 
missile function.  This must not be mistaken for the adoption of missile combat, as this 
was simply an embodiment of the Roman military ethos.  Under this model the selected 
youngsters were lightly armed and ran before the advancing hastati, showered the enemy 
with javelins, and then retreated back behind Roman lines.  Individuals given this heroic 
role were lightly armed and served no other purpose after they had exhausted their 
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projectiles.  Thus it is safe to assume that maniple organization preceded manipular 
tactics.   
 From the classical sources, it can be determined with absolute certainty that 
the adoption of missile tactics was not a wholesale reform.  According to Polybius, by the 
period of the Punic Wars, assumedly the First Punic War, only the hastati and principes 
had gone over to manipular tactics (the usage of a projectile prior to closing to use the 
sword).  The triarii, however, were still using the long spear and –presumably- fighting 
as a phalanx.
236
  Although scholars have criticised Polybius of describing an army no 
longer in existence in his day, he nonetheless illustrates that the adoption of missile 
warfare was a gradual progression.
237
  Dionysius of Halicarnassus reinforced this by 
stating that the principes during the Pyrrhic War were still fighting with the heavy hoplite 
spear.
238
  This suggests the hastati alone were using manipular tactics during this period.  
Livy mentions that the Romans stopped to recover javelins during the battle of Sentinum, 
in order to use them against the Gallic testudo.
239
  This passage may underline a shift 
towards manipular tactics, as Roman forces begun to rely on missiles to disrupt enemy 
formations prior to closing; this passage, however, makes no mention of which troops 
were retrieving these javelins, and may have merely been referring to the leves or rorarii.   
  From these statements it seems apparent that the switch to manipular tactics 
was a gradual process of reform spanning decades, spreading from hastati, to principes, 
and then lastly to the triarii.  Dionysius’s narrative places the initial adoption of missile 
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combat prior to 280 BC.
240
  This also suggests that missile combat may have pre-dated 
the formal adoption of the pilum- assuming that the pilum evolved after interactions with 
models of Iberian descent; this would certainly make sense of Ennius’s statement, 
“Hastati spargunt hastas, fit ferreus imber.”241  Although this should not be stressed, it 
does reinforce the idea that the earliest hastati were at some point armed with the hasta, 
or at least a lighter derivative of it.  If correct, this could also help clarify the comments 
of Varro, which claimed that the hastati originally fought with the hasta –hence hastati, 
one armed with the spear.
242
  Rather than imply that the principes and hastati had 
reversed position at some point, which has been argued by some scholars, it seems more 
likely that the hastati were singled out because they were armed with a throwing spear 
rather than a thrusting one.
243
  Thus it is likely that the front ranks were armed with a 
lighter form of hasta which could not only be used for fighting, but was also thrown.  
Yet, Alistar Small took this concept further, believing that the traditional heavy hasta was 
used not only for thrusting, but for throwing as well.
244
  If this is accurate, then the 
traditional understanding that missile combat only began in earnest following the fourth 
century is false.  It is important to note, however, that Small’s comment is contrary to 
most of the literary descriptions of the hasta as being a long, heavy spear.  Livy, although 
supporting the notion that the hasta could be thrown, states that it had little impact in 
comparison to the pilum.
245
  Due to the troublesome usage of hasta, which literally means 
spear, it is hard to determine the significance of Livy’s comment.  It seems unlikely that 
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the traditional hoplite hasta was thrown, considering that the triarii retained the hasta the 
longest, and there is little evidence suggesting that they ever threw their spears.  What is 
most likely is that the traditional hasta used by the hoplites and later triarii was a 
different weapon than the throwing hastae adopted by the hastati in the fourth century. 
 The Pyrrhic War thus serves as the latest plausible date for the adoption of 
Roman missile warfare by the hastati.  Establishing a starting parameter however, proves 
a little more problematic.  Although the accounts of Livy and Plutarch are extremely 
problematic in their treatment of military matters, they nonetheless offer the earliest 
plausible date for this adaption, c.380 BC.  These two authors suggest that the pilum 
(which clearly is used in relation to missile combat) was experimented with by Camillus 
following the Gallic Sack.  While this is probably little more than annalistic fiction, it 
remains the earliest reference to missile warfare.   Furthermore, as the earliest dating for 
the maniple organization coincides with this dating, and it is unlikely that missile tactics 
predated the maniple, 380 BC seems an apt starting location.  
 Although the Camillan reform theory appears unsalvageable, the idea that 
the Romans experimented with manipular tactics following the Gallic Sack is not 
implausible.  As has been mentioned, the Cisalpine Gauls are believed to have fought in 
manner similar to other Italian peoples, relying primarily on the spear rather than the 
sword.  Therefore, it is not surprising that archaeological finds during this period have 
illustrated that the Cisalpine Celts were experimenting with javelins during the fourth 
century BC.
246
  In fact the later heavy javelin of the Roman army, the gaesum, was of 
Gallic genesis.  Thus it is likely that during the Gallic-Roman conflicts of 367 BC both 
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sides were experimenting with a proto-pilum.
247
  In the case of the Romans, however, this 
experimentation did not lead to the formal adoption of manipular tactics, as Rawson 
explains that this use of missile combat was a temporary measure at this juncture.
248
  
While this episode shows that the Romans were beginning to experiment with different 
forms and uses of the javelin, the switch to manipular tactics probably had not occurred 
by 340 BC.  Livy’s description of the maniple in 340 lacks any telling indication of 
manipular tactics- but rather only reinforces the typical distinction between javelin-
throwers and spear-fighters.
249
  While scholars have accepted his description of the early 
maniple, they tend to reject his dating, believing that the maniple did not come into 
existence until the period of the Samnite Wars.
250
  If this is indeed the case, then there 
appears to be a valid Samnite connection to the Roman adoption of manipular tactics.        
 The Samnites themselves were not adverse to missile combat.  In his article 
“The Use of Javelins in Central and South Italy in the Fourth Century BC,” Allistar Small 
argues that the Samnites, more than any other Italic grouping, were on the forefront of the 
development of missile combat.
251
  Not only does the Greek name for the Samnites mean 
javelin-throwers, but the archaeological evidence clearly indicates that they often carried 
multiple dual purpose spears.  The Capestrano Warrior suggests that early Safin- warriors 
were armed with two spears, possibly aclydes, as early as the sixth century BC.
252
  One 
Samnite skyphos further reinforces this, displaying a Samnite hoplite carrying two spears 
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into battle.
253
  Another example comes from a krater which depicts a Samnite hoplite at 
rest, again holding two identical spears.
254
  Depictions of Samnites carrying two spears 
prove extremely common within the Samnite archaeological record.   While excavations 
of Samnite tombs have produced only a couple instances of multiple spears, this does not 
discredit the theory, as iron was extremely rare within Samnite territories.
255
 This also 
probably accounts for the dearth of spears recovered in Samnium from the sixth to fourth 
century BC.  Scholars have also further suggested that the standard spears were simply 
too long to fit into the simple grave pits of southern Italic tribes and thus were not 
commonly buried with the dead.
256
  While this practice of carrying of multiple spears into 
battle is not by any means unique to the Samnites, their form and function were. 
  What is unique about the Samnites over other Italian peoples, is their 
preference for heavier dual-purpose spears.  These spears were used for both thrusting 
and throwing, unlike the lighter, specialized javelins of southern Apulia.
257
  Samnite 
tomb paintings from Campania commonly depict warriors in scenes of javelin warfare.  A 
tomb painting from Capua, originally displayed in the Museo Campano before being 
destroyed in WW2, shows two Samnite warriors duelling.
258
  In this painting both 
warriors have short spears protruding from their bodies, clearly indicating this was 
reflecting actual combat and not an exhibition.  Furthermore, the first warrior is grasping 
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his spear in an overhead position, strongly suggesting that he is in the process of throwing 
it.  Tomb 1 from the Arcioni necropolis in Paestum contains a similar scene of spears 
being used as missiles.  This preference for multi-purpose spears is also represented in 
Samnite pottery.  An Apulian column krater depicts a victorious Samnite warrior about to 
throw a broad-leaf styled spear at his defeated adversary.
259
  Another fourth century piece 
of pottery, a Lucanian nestoris, shows two Samnite footman wielding similar spears: the 
first soldier is using his as a projectile, while the second is using his as a thrusting spear 
to ward off a horseman.
260
  The similarity of the spears being used for both thrusting and 
throwing in these depictions provide evidence that the Samnites harboured a preference 
for spears that could be used for both purposes.  In a discussion of spears uncovered from 
grave sites around Paestum and Satricanum, Yvonn Inall agreed with this conclusion, 
stating that Samnite tribes generally preferred spears of dual purposes rather than simple 
thrusting or throwing ones.
 261
  Samnite tomb excavations have repeatedly uncovered 
these dual purpose spears alongside hoplite amour, indicating a heavily armoured 
Samnite infantry that was able to effectively engage in missile combat as well as close 
combat.
262
  Samnite infantry were so well versed in missile combat that they were even 
inclined to throw rocks when they ran out of formal projectiles.
263
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  By the late fourth century the Romans, Gauls, Etruscans, and Oscans had all 
begun experimenting with javelins.  Although the Gallic gaesum, the Etruscan telum, and 
the Oscan aclys may have been the prototypes for the later Roman pilum, they cannot 
have been what pushed the Romans towards manipular tactics.  Unlike other Italic 
groupings, the Romans and Samnites, by the end of the fourth century, seem to have 
fought in the same broad manner.
264
  Thus, it seems highly probable that Roman 
manipular tactics were learnt from their Oscan neighbours.  While the Samnites are often 
considered spearmen par excellence, a recent study of Samnite skeletal robusticity 
discovered a startling amount of projectile and sword induced trauma among the graves 
at Alfeneda (fifth-sixth century BC).
265
  From this evidence, it appears that the Samnite 
warrior was not only comfortable in missile warfare, but just as suited to hand-to-hand 
combat, relying heavily on swords and spear alike.  The fact that the Samnites regularly 
fought with swords seems to validate the theory that one of their two spears was solely 
for throwing; they could throw their first spear with impunity, knowing that they had a 
sword if their last spear broke.  While the extant evidence should not be pressed too far, it 
does suggest that the Samnites practiced a form of manipular tactics, wherein they threw 
projectiles to weaken their enemies, followed by an assault with remaining spears and 
swords.  This appears to support Frontinus’s claim that the Samnite initial charge was 
hard to withstand.
266
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 There is little reason to doubt that the Romans adopted manipular tactics 
from the Samnites, plausibly starting to experiment with them following the adoption of 
the maniple, possibly around 311 BC.  In all likelihood the formal adoption of manipular 
tactics occurred sometime during the context of the Third Samnite War.  While it is 
impossible to prove this with absolute certainty, the literary and archaeological evidence 
does suggest that the Romans learnt manipular tactics from their Samnite neighbours 
sometime during this period.     
 The literary tradition which ascribed a large number of military reforms to 
the Samnites appears to be extremely flawed, but salvageable nonetheless.  The maniple 
probably was born from a Samnite model and was adopted during the Samnite Wars, but 
there simply isn’t enough evidence to prove this.  While the Samnites probably retained a 
rectangular shield after their Italic neighbours abandoned it in favour of the aspis, the 
scutum is not of Samnite origin; the Samnites may, however, have helped shift Roman 
preference back towards the scutum.  The literary record also wrongly ascribes the pilum 
to the Samnites, as it was probably a Roman innovation based off Celtic, Etruscan, and 
Oscan influences.  Yet, since the sources seem to know little of the earliest manipular 
organizations, it is probable that when they ascribed the pilum to the Samnites, they 
meant manipular tactics.  What can be stated for certain is that the maniple and manipular 
tactics were forged and refined during the period of the Samnite Wars.               
 Outside of these military armaments and organizations, scholars have 
suggested that a wider range of Roman military innovations may have also occurred 
during the Samnite War, due its unprecedented length and scale.  One of these 
adaptations is the formalization of wages for Roman soldiers.  Most scholars tend to see 
82 
 
the formal adoption of the stipendarii emerging sometime during the Samnite Wars, with 
the siege of Veii only seeing a temporary adoption of wages.
267
  One of the major 
arguments for this is that Rome had not yet begun minting its own currency.   Yet not all 
scholars view this as being an issue, as Rich suggests that at this juncture wages were 
probably paid in weighted bronze.
268
   He however, agrees that the institutionalization of 
the stipendarii probably occurred sometime during the prolonged conflict with the 
Samnites.  Another interesting theory is offered by Southern, who has suggested that the 
Samnite Wars may have also seen the introduction of Rome camp building.  Her 
justification for this is that these conflicts were the first protracted combat outside of 
Latium, and as such, was the first occasion in Roman history when armies were within 
enemy territory for a sustained period of time.
269
  While these reforms may have been 
adopted during the Samnite Wars, there is simply not enough evidence to confirm or 
deny them.   
  In terms of overall significance, the Samnite influences on the Roman 
military prove extremely vital to the emergence of Roman power.  It was the adaptation 
of the maniple and manipular tactics which would forever alter the shape, structure, and 
tactics of Roman armies, fostering the beginning stages of a professional army.  Under 
the manipular organization, Rome emerged victorious over all other Italian tribes, 
establishing its mandate to rule over a unified Italy, as well as later providing Rome with 
a sizable overseas empire.   
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Chapter 3 
The Samnite Oath 
 One interesting aspect of Samnite culture which left a lasting impression upon the 
burgeoning Roman state is the Samnite military oath.  Described in detail only by Livy, 
this bloody sacrament, although often described in contrast with Roman humanitarianism, 
formed the basis for the evolving Roman sacramentum militare (soldier’s oath).270  The 
Samnite oath was unique within the Italic world prior to the third century BC, in that it 
was mandatory.  Undertaken by Samnite citizens, this oath effectively transformed 
civilians into soldiers through a combination of religious consecration and legal 
ramifications.  Although Samnite society eventually merged with Roman society 
following the former’s final defeat in the Pyrrhic War, the mandatory soldier’s pledge of 
the Samnite amalgamated with the pre-existing Roman sacramentum. The resulting oath 
helped sever the soldier from the world of the citizen, facilitating the development of 
professional soldiers by allowing for a more rigid, yet more diverse legion through the 
use of severe punishments.      
The Samnite oath is best described by Livy, who provides the only details 
concerning its use.  Following the defeat of the pan-Italian alliance at Sentinum in 295 
BC, the Samnites were fighting an increasingly desperate war against an empowered 
Rome.  Lacking in manpower and resources, the Samnites resolved to make a final stand 
against Roman aggression.  In order to achieve this, the Samnites issued a lex sacrata, 
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which officially conscripted all men of military age.  Those who failed to assemble or 
who departed without their generals’ leave were to forfeit their life as a sacrifice to 
Jupiter.
271
  Assembling at Aquilonia, the Samnite men were forced to swear a solemn 
oath that they would faithfully follow their generals into battle and that they would never 
abandon their lines.  The last stipulation of this oath was that each Samnite swore that he 
would instantly cut down any fellow soldiers caught fleeing.
272
  Like any oath, this was a 
deeply religious event invoking divine consequences for failure to uphold one’s 
pledge.
273
  The Samnite army gathered at Aquilonia imposed curses not only upon their 
persons but also upon their entire family if they should fail to uphold their promises.  The 
final and most noteworthy aspect of this oath is that those who refused it were 
immediately slain and beheaded to serve as a warning to others.
274
  Thus this oath was 
mandatory.  Livy’s details of the Samnite oath at Aquilonia involved many significant 
factors: a lex sacrata, religious dedication, military executions, and an interesting 
combination of a Roman coniuratio (pact) and sacramentum (citizens military oath).  
 The historicity of the “Samnite Oath,” as documented by Livy, has drawn 
substantial criticism from contemporary authors.  Salmon, in particular, was inclined to 
dismiss the entire incident as a “Livian fabrication”.275  Admittedly, there are several key 
flaws within Livy’s narrative.  This ancient sacrament is described as having been 
administered in strict secrecy by a middle-aged Samnite priest by the name of Ovius 
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Paccius.
276
  This proves problematic to Salmon and other modern scholars, as they 
believe it is unlikely that such an oath could have been administered in haste to so many 
soldiers in such secrecy.  Oakley adheres to this, believing the clandestine aspect of this 
sacrament to not only be redundant, but an actual hindrance to army recruitment.
277
  On 
this occasion, this oath was supposedly administered in the middle of the Samnite camp 
to either the entire army of forty thousand, or just to sixteen thousand elite soldiers, ten at 
a time.  This would not only prove to be a rather arduous and lengthy affair, but rather 
ridiculous, given that a mere linen wall was supposed to have provided privacy from the 
rest of the camp- hardly a secure environment for undertaking clandestine activities.  
Furthermore, there appears little reason to keep the taking of such an oath a secret, as any 
army, in theory at least, would be loath to attack such determined defenders.  Livy even 
suggested that the Romans were aware of this oath prior to engaging with the Samnites at 
Aquilonia.  On a previous occasion, the Romans under Papirius Cursor had encountered a 
force of Samnites “who had dedicated themselves in the Samnite manner,” but were able 
to repel their magic by offering them up as a sacrifice to Orcus.
278
  This not only suggests 
that this practice was known to the Romans, but also that it was a common facet of 
Samnite military culture.  Clearly, Livy’s description of a clandestine oath sworn in 
absolute secrecy is fiction, as the Romans were not only familiar with it, but had actively 
engaged in attempts to negate its demoralising affects.
279
  Interestingly the military oaths 
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of other Mediterranean societies, such as that of the Hitittes and Romans, while probably 
not shared with their enemies, were not overly secretive, having survived to this day.
280
    
 While Salmon was correct to view Livy’s assertions with suspicion, at least in 
regards to the oath’s secretive nature, his dismissal of the entire incident at Aquilonia 
proves extreme.  His justification for this stems from the name of the Samnite priest and 
the presence of a linen book from which this ritual was allegedly conducted.  Strangely, 
Salmon’s argument accepts not only that Ovius and Paccius were common Oscan names, 
but also illustrates that linen books were indeed a feature of early Italic cultures.
281
  Key 
examples of Italian linen books include the Libri Sibyllini and the Libri Lintei 
Magistratum.
282
  Salmon concluded, however, that the name of the priest and the use of a 
linen book were so common that they had to be mere “stage-props.”283   To him, this all 
proves far too stereotypical and therefore must have been the invention of Livy.  Ovius 
and Paccius were the most prevalent of all Oscan names and he compares Livy’s usage of 
these names as to how an Irishman within an English narrative is always Pat.
284
  
Furthermore, he asserts that Livy was aware of the alleged Osco-Samnite origin of the 
Sibylline books and included a similar linen book to add verisimilitude to his narrative.  
Salmon is correct to doubt the historicity of the linen book which, according to Livy, 
dated back into the pre-literate stage of Samnite history, written prior to the Samnite sack 
of Capua in 423.
285
  Obviously this seems unlikely, but it is impossible to fully rule-out.  
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The crux of his argument however, remains that the described details are simply ‘too 
Oscan’.  This is an extremely flawed approach and is not reason enough to dismiss Livy’s 
narrative.  While it may remain overly stereotypical, there seems little reason to believe 
that Livy’s account is completely fiction; stereotypical is not synonymous with fictional.   
Aside from the Samnite priest and the linen book, the physical location of 
Aquilonia has also garnered a large amount of scholarly scrutiny, with some arguing it 
was in northern Samnium and others arguing it was in southern Samnium; Beloch even 
argued that this event was simply a jumbled retrojection of Carvilius’s hypothetical 
conquest of the Sabine city of Amiternum.
286
  Simone Sisani recently placed Aquilonia at 
the Samnite sanctuary of Pietrabbondante, although this argument is unsubstantiated and 
is highly unlikely.
287
  Regardless of the geographical location of ancient Aquilonia, 
however, most scholars tend to accept the underlying conditions surrounding the Samnite 
oath.  The lex sacrata appears to have been a common facet of Italian societies, practiced 
not only by Samnites but also by the Volsci and Etruscans.
288
  Not to be confused with 
the Roman lex sacrata of 494 BC, which was legislation making the tribunes sacrosanct, 
the Italian military institution generally involved a compulsory levy followed by the 
swearing of oaths.  Filippo Coarelli suggested that these levies assembled at Samnite 
sanctuaries, such as Pietrabbondante, where they would typically undergo initiation 
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rites.
289
  To this extent he suggested that the levies of 293 probably assembled at 
Pietrabbondante rather than in the city of Aquilonia itself; however this view assumes a 
certain geographical proximity between these two locales.   
Outside of Livy, only two other classical authors provide mention of the Samnite 
lex sacrata. Dio Cassius recorded a tale similar to that of Livy: that the Samnites held 
compulsory levies under the pain of death and those who mustered were forced to swear 
terrible oaths upon themselves.
290
  Outside of Dio, Pliny the Elder provides a far more 
compelling piece of evidence, suggesting that Spurius Carvilius erected a statue of Jupiter 
in the capital after he defeated a Samnite force bound by sacred oaths.
291
  Pliny’s passage, 
written independently of Livy’s narrative, reflects the material Livy probably found in his 
sources on this event.
292
  Thus it appears that Salmon’s view is untenable, as Livy’s 
account of Aquilonia seems to have been based on older sources.  Oakley sees no reason 
to doubt the accuracy of Livy’s information, as his main source for this narrative was 
Fabius Pictor, who wrote only a generation after the events of Aquilonia and 
Cominium.
293
   
While Livy clearly couldn’t resist adding some embellishments to his narrative of 
Aquilonia, the underlying information pertaining to the lex sacrata seems trustworthy.  
Likewise, the majority of Livy’s details concerning the Samnite oath at Aquilonia seem 
credible.  Even Livy’s linen-clad sacred square, where the legio linteata conducted their 
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initiation rites, appears historical.
294
 While conducting archaeological excavations at 
Pietrabbondante, Adriano La Regina discovered an area of similar dimension between the 
Oscan theatre and the frontal alignment of the later Temple B.
295
  Also found at 
Pietrabbondante was an Oscan inscription dating to the latter half of the third century 
which reads, safinim sak(araklum), referring to a sacred dedication.
296
  Not only does this 
appear to support Livy’s narrative, but it appears to reinforce Coarelli’s argument that 
Samnite armies mustered at religious sanctuaries to undergo initiation rites.  Thus both 
the lex sacrata and the initiation rites mentioned by Livy appear to have been historical 
aspects of Samnite military culture.  
Outside of these archaeological finds, which have supported much of Livy’s 
narrative, little evidence has been uncovered which attests to the Samnite oath itself.  
This, however, is not cause for concern, as these oaths were probably oral traditions; the 
the Samnites of the fourth and third century BC were still in the transitionary period from 
a non-literate to literate society.  Thus, in order to examine the Samnite oath, scholars are 
forced to rely solely on external literary sources.   Ever pragmatic concerning Livy’s 
historical tradition, Salmon credited the Samnite Oath to Livy’s imagination, believing it 
simply to be “a more savage version of standard Roman procedure.”297  Yet while the 
Samnite oath indeed shows a striking similarity to the later military oath of the Roman 
army, this is not just cause for its dismissal.  Contrary to Salmon’s assertion, the 
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Romanness of the Samnite Oath actually validates it, as the Romans and Samnites 
inherited a common religious and cultural outlook on military oaths.
298
  This resemblance 
to the later Roman ius iurandum is probably also due to a direct Samnite influence, as 
will be argued below.  Furthermore, the Samnite oath makes logical sense, given the 
extreme context in which it was applied.  The Samnites, having lost at Sentinum, were 
now completely isolated against the burgeoning military power of Rome.  Samnite 
victories were becoming rarer in the early third century and Roman armies were 
marching deeper into Samnium every year.  It became evident to the Samnites that they 
were facing the destruction of their society.  Against this Roman aggression, they decided 
to muster their remaining strength to make a final stand at Aquilonia and Cominium.  It is 
in this bleak situation that the Samnite military oath was applied.  In this context the 
terms of the oath do not seem all that noteworthy.  That they cursed themselves and their 
families is somewhat redundant considering that, regardless of the oath, if they lost all of 
Samnium would be conquered.   
Rather than calling Livy’s account in question, the archaeological remains of 
Samnite sites have only supported it.  While concerns have been raised over the location 
of Aquilonia, the name of the priest, and the events concerning the pullarius, these 
concerns are speculative and do not affect the historicity of the oath itself.
299
  It is evident 
that the events around Aquilonia were not Livian fiction, as his confusion regarding who 
exactly took the oath –the entire army or just the legio linteata- clearly stems from a 
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separate, fragmentary source.
300
  Since there are no concrete objections to Livy’s 
description of the Samnite oath, it seems safe to assume that it is a relatively accurate 
depiction of the event. 
The Samnite oath has traditionally received a large amount of scholarly attention.  
Too often, however, this oath has been cited in contrast with the coinciding Roman oath 
of the period in order to form a moral lesson.  Perhaps the best example of this comes 
from Machiavelli, who contrasted Samnite religiosity with Roman virtue. According to 
his understanding, the Samnites turned to religion to help bolster their resolve, but were 
ultimately undone by the superior power of Roman virtu.
 301
  This understanding falls into 
Livy’s ethnocentric understanding of the event and as such must be disregarded.  In all 
likelihood the Samnite forces at Aquilonia probably did fight harder than previous 
armies, making a last ditch effort to repel the Romans.  There is little evidence to support 
Machiavelli’s understanding that the Samnites used religion as a salve to recover their 
lost virtu; the religious initiation of the Samnite army at Aquilonia was not a new 
concept, but was a pre-existing practice.   A more tenable understanding is to view the 
Samnites at Aquilonia as a sacrifice, a devotion en masse; this agrees with Dio 8.39.29, 
which suggests that the Samnites had the intention of fighting to the last man.  Looking 
beyond the moral comparisons of Machiavelli, the real significance of this event has 
apparently gone unnoticed.  Assuming that Livy’s details are correct, the Samnite oath 
was not a savage and amoral sacramentum to be contrasted with Roman virtue, but was a 
precursor to the later Roman military oath.  
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One of the most significant aspects of the Samnite oath of 293 BC is that it was 
compulsory. Every soldier who answered the summons was expected to swear an oath of 
obedience to his general, alongside a condition never to leave the ranks, lest he risk 
severe punishments.
302
  The Romans of the period apparently swore an oath only to 
assemble at the consul’s command and not to leave until permitted.303  This oath is 
generally referred to as the sacramentum which was generally followed by a coniuratio, a 
voluntary oath sworn amongst the soldiers not to leave the ranks except to recover a 
weapon or save a citizen.
304
  Rawlings has suggested that the coniuratio illustrates a large 
amount of freedom for individual soldiers in the early Republican legions.
305
  Not only 
does this adequately describe the conditions of Rome’s pre-professional army, but it also 
reflects Rome’s warrior culture, including a longstanding tradition of individual acts of 
valour and duelling.  The parameters of the sacramentum, however, prove hard to define.  
Servius provided a succinct working definition:  
 sacramentum, in quo iurat unusquisque milesse non recedere nisi   
  praecepto consulis post completa stipendia, id est militiae tempora.
306
  
The sacramentum, in which each soldier swears not to abandon the   
 ranks unless by consent of the consuls, after having completed his    
 term of military service.
307
 
This definition however, clearly reflects an imperial military oath and is not suggestive of 
the conditions of the early-mid Republican army.  One issue within Servius’s definition is 
the reference to a stipendium (term of service), which was not in existence until the late 
                                                             
    
302
Livy, X: 38: 3-5. 
    
303
Livy XXII: 38:2-5.  
    
304
Livy, XXII: 38:2-5.  
    
305
Rawlings, 57.  
    
306
Serv. ad Aen. VII: 614. 
    
307
Translation by author.  
93 
 
Republic.  Furthermore, if the soldiers already swore not to leave the ranks, the 
coniuratio seems redundant. 
 Another description of the early sacramentum comes from Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus.  Dionysius recorded the sacramentum as being an oath promising to 
follow the consuls in any wars, to never abandon the standards, and to obey all laws.
308
  
While this description of the earliest sacramentum seems acceptable enough, his 
reference to the standards is questionable for the same reasons as stated in regards to 
Servius’s definition.  Furthermore, Dionysius’s imperial dating garners further suspicion 
upon his statement.  Aulus Gellius, in discussing the sacramentum, notably said nothing 
of Dionysius’s oath to the consuls, but stated that it was merely a promise to assemble 
and abide by Rome’s laws.309   This understanding proves complimentary to Livy’s 
comments at 22:38.   Given the context and the form of Rome’s early legions, it seems 
likely that the earliest sacramentum was simply a citizen’s oath to assemble at the 
consuls’ biddings and not to leave the legion until dismissed.  This, however, was 
drastically different than the later oath of loyalty which invoked severe punishments for 
unmanly acts and immorality.  
 The sacramentum and voluntary coniuratio of the Roman army eventually were 
combined, evolving into a new mandatory soldier’s oath, akin to that of the Samnites.  
During the emergencies of the Second Punic War, Rome found herself in an increasingly 
desperate position as Hannibal plundered his way through Apulia unchecked.  The earlier 
battles at the Trebia and Lake Traismene had crippled the Roman military’s operational 
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ability and shattered Roman morale.
310
  These battles not only posed a significant threat 
to Roman hegemony in Italy, but also to Rome’s very survival.  Rome now found herself 
in a similar situation to that of the Samnites at Aquilonia: disheartened by repeated 
defeats and unable to repel an aggressive invader.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
Romans copied the Samnites in their war preparations.  Livy records that under Gaius 
Terentius Varro, the Roman legions were administered a mandatory oath by their tribunes 
for the first time.
311
  Although the exact words of this oath are not recorded, Livy implies 
that this new oath was a combination of the sacramentum and the coniuratio.  It is 
probable that the sacramentum documented by Dio, Dionysius, and Servius was actually 
the later military oath of allegiance.      
One of the most significant aspects of the new compulsory military oath is that it 
included an oath of obedience to the consul and his officers.
312
  The terms of this novel 
oath, henceforth ius iurandum, proved significant to the military and political evolution 
of Rome.
313
  Sworn at the moment of recruitment, this oath reinforced the authority of the 
Roman generals, making each soldier bound to his consul.  This had drastic implications 
for the later Roman state when soldiers became more tied to individual generals than they 
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did to the Republic.  Yet, as this oath originates from a period when generals were elected 
annually, it is unlikely any foresaw this problem.
314
 Since these oaths were not retaken 
every year, like they were under the Empire, soldiers probably swore allegiance to the 
office of the consul, rather than to an individual consul.
315
  Aside from the political 
ramifications, the ius iurandum revoked the freedoms of individual soldiers on the 
battlefield.  Polybius, describing the army around the period of the third Punic War, 
documents the drastic changes to the Roman army.  Under the voluntary coniuratio, a 
Roman soldier, according to Livy, was allowed to freely leave the ranks in order to save a 
citizen or to find a weapon.  This was not the case in Polybius’s day, as the loss of arms 
came to represent cowardice, and soldiers often threw themselves into the enemy lines to 
avoid this shame.
316
  Although Polybius reiterated how soldiers who saved civilians or 
voluntarily engaged the enemy were still rewarded, this seems more rhetoric than reality, 
as Roman soldiers engaging the enemy without orders was never a tolerated practice.
317
  
Thus the shift from the sacramentum\coniurare to the ius iurandum corresponded with a 
shift of focus away from the individual towards group unity 
The Samnite oath at Aquilonia shows a comparable emphasis on unity, as it 
stipulated that each soldier was obligated to kill fellow Samnites caught deserting.  This 
clause was clearly designed to reinforce group cohesion.  Analogous to the later Roman 
military oath, this stressed the importance of formation and group unity, rather than 
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individual freedom, through the incorporation of severe punishments.  According to the 
Samnite oath, any soldier had the legal right to cut down any of his fellow soldiers 
suspected of desertion.
318
  This not only increased Samnite resolve, but increased the 
army’s cohesion, as in the fog of war it would have been easy to mistake a soldier 
temporarily retreating from one deserting.  Thus soldiers under such an oath would have 
been loath to make a move without the express consent of their commanders.
319
  Not only 
does this coincide with Polybius’s comments concerning the loss of weaponry and the 
rigidity of later Roman armies, but it echoes Roman disciplinary policy.  
Andrew Feldherr, while commenting on Livy’s account, explained that the 
Samnite oath effectively made each soldier view his compatriots as his prospective 
killers, whereas the Roman coniuraratio made soldiers view each other as their 
prospective savior.
320
  Despite Livy’s attempt to illustrate the virtue of the Roman 
constitution, the Samnites and Romans apparently shared an identical methodology on 
militaris disciplina (military discipline).  Less than a century after the events at 
Aquilonia, Polybius wrote about two Roman punishments which effectively mimicked 
the Samnite example: the bastinado and decimatio.
321
  Both of these extremely savage 
punishments were carried out not by the consuls, but by the individual soldiers 
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themselves.  Under these disciplinary actions, victims were savagely beaten to death by 
their fellow soldiers, which in the case of the decimatio usually meant that soldiers were 
forced to kill members of their own contubernia.
322
  The emerging Roman mentality 
doesn’t appear to be all that different from that of the Samnites.  The Roman consul 
Atilius Regulus in 294 BC commanded his cohort to cut down any Romans who 
attempted to flee the battlefield; this act occurred before the dreaded oath of the 
Samnites.
323
  Thus the Samnites and Romans appear to have shared a similar approach to 
military discipline.   
In terms of military discipline, the Samnite oath helped shaped the structure and 
legality of later Roman notions of warfare.  The mandatory oath administered to the 
Roman legions not only allowed generals to exert more authority, but allowed them to 
enforce more drastic forms of discipline.
324
  This is because, under the new ius iurandum, 
the standard mechanism for enforcing military discipline shifted away from the 
traditional norms.  Although little about the military of the early Republic is known with 
any certainty, it seems apparent that it was not as rigid and structured as the later legions.  
The coniuratio described by Livy does not describe a legion directly controlled from the 
top down.  Rather, Livy’s voluntary pledge suggests that Rome’s early legions relied 
heavily upon social expectations, as it was public disgrace and humiliation rather than 
direct punishment which kept soldiers brave.  In the early Republic, humiliation proved 
worse than direct punishment.  A clear example of this comes from the consuls Spurius 
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Postumius Albinus and Titus Veturius Calvinus.  These two consuls, having signed an 
undesirable peace treaty with the Samnites after the defeat at the Caudine Forks in 321 
BC, afterwards offered themselves to the Samnites as prisoners; clearly they perceived 
living as prisoners in Samnium as being preferable to living as disgraced citizens in 
Rome.
325
  Despite the voluntary submission of the acting consuls, the rank and file of the 
Roman army went unpunished for their actions at the Caudine Forks; even the disgraceful 
loss at the Allia seemingly went unpunished. 
It is likely that the early armies of the Republic maintained discipline far more 
through these social mechanisms rather than a direct system of reward and punishment.  
This is not to say that consuls couldn’t enact punishments upon their legions, but rather 
that discipline was less formalized in this period.
326
  By the period of the Polybian legions 
in c.220, however, Roman discipline was firmly within the hands of individual generals.  
This is directly due to the incorporation of the mandatory military oath, sine qua non.
327
 
   Although the introduction of the ius iurandum allowed for the application of 
severe military punishments, social pressures continued to exert significant influence on 
military discipline well into the late Republic.  Polybius’s description of the bastinado 
attests to this.  Those subjected to the bastinado who were lucky enough to escape camp 
alive were completely ostracised, banished from their homes and shunned by their 
                                                             
    
325
Livy IX:VI. 
    
326
Although Nicolet views uncodified discipline as being more severe, this is due to his observance 
of the traditional misconception of the golden age of Republican discipline.  Although this will be 
discussed in length later, it was only with the legality of the ius iurandum that severe military 
punishments were able to be applied with regularity: Nicolet, 106.  
    
327
Chrissanthos, 322: “The swearing of the oath [ius iurandum] was the basis of the Roman military 
disciplinary system.” 
99 
 
families.
328
  These social pressures were even more paramount within the contubernia 
itself, as each man fought to earn the respect of his fellow soldiers while avoiding their 
ridicule.
329
  Sulla commended Marius for his ability to control his armies not through 
martial discipline, but through shame.
330
          
The ius iurandum drastically changed the average Roman’s military experience.  
Not only did it drastically consolidate the general’s authority over his soldiers, but its 
legal and religious nature allowed for the eventual emergence of professional soldiers.  
Under the early Republic, warfare was an annual, primarily seasonal, occupation for the 
Roman citizen. This army was composed entirely of citizen-soldiers who learnt soldiery 
on the go.
331
  The average soldier in any given year doubtlessly spent more time as a 
citizen than he did as a soldier.  Although this started to change during the Samnite war, 
it was during the Punic Wars that the spheres of the soldier and civilian officially began 
to diverge.  The nature of Rome’s conflicts in the third century BC facilitated this 
separation, as Roman legions were required to serve year-round in distant locations, such 
as Sicily, Illyria, and Hispania.  Soldiery now became a full time occupation and a 
distinct soldiers’ culture began to emerge.  At the heart of this new culture was the ius 
iurandum, which served as the legion’s initiation rite.  All new soldiers were now 
expected to shed off their civilian life, albeit temporarily, and swear the oath which 
formally administered them into the legion.  By taking the ius iurandum, the recruit cast 
aside his citizenship so that only the miles (soldier) remained.
332
  Under the early 
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Republic, such a distinction could not have been made, but with the inclusion of this oath 
the distinction between the two became extremely apparent.  This point is best illustrated 
by Cicero, who writing two centuries later, remarked upon the discernible differences 
between the spheres of the soldier and civilian.  
Cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem, Catonis quoque  
 filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum amore pugnandi   
 in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut, si eum patitur in  
 exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae sacramento, quia priore   
 amisso iure cum hostibus pugnare non poterat.
333
 
When it was decided by Popilius to dismiss one legion, Cato’s son, who   
 was serving in the same legion, was to be released from service.  But when 
 out of love for the army, he remained, Cato wrote to Popilius, that, if his   
 son wished to remain in the army, he should swear a second military oath,  
 since having earlier been dismissed from service, as by law he was currently  
 unable to engage the enemy.
334
    
 
To later Romans the ius iurandum was what separated the soldier from the citizen, and 
homicide from murder.   
This oath not only appealed to Roman legalism concerning conduct in a just war, 
but also incorporated Roman religious notions.  Sharing a similar religious heritage, the 
religiosity of the Samnite oath would have appealed to Roman militarism.  Oaths in the 
ancient world were religious affairs, usually involving a declaration of intent on the 
behalf of the participant before witnesses, both divine and human.
335
  Inviting the gods to 
oversee the oath, the oath-taker simultaneously invokes supernatural punishments for 
violation of said oaths.  It is not surprising that the earliest Roman military oath, the 
sacramentum forms the basis for the English word sacrament- never used outside a 
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religious context.  Although Nicolet has suggested that the ius iurandum did not entail the 
religious significance of the sacramentum, this understanding is inherently flawed, as 
most ancient oaths were fundamentally religious affairs; even in the modern, secular 
world, most judicial proceedings still require witnesses to swear an oath before God.
336
  
Thus the religious overtone of the Samnite oath is not unique; standard Roman procedure 
was to consult the gods prior to any declaration of war, and battlefield results were 
viewed as indications of divine favour- or disfavour.
337
  What is significant about the 
Samnite oath at Aquilonia, however, is that it made the individual Samnite soldier sacred.   
Administered by a religious figure in the presence of the gods, the Samnite oath 
essentially made each soldier into a religious servant, expected to sacrifice his life for the 
Samnite cause.  It, therefore, does not seem overly stretched to think of the Samnite 
soldiers as being sacrificial victims themselves.   
 This sacrificial aspect of the Samnite oath remained within the Roman ius 
iurandum.  Vegetius stated that every Roman who took the military oath promised to 
obey his general and sacrifice his life for the Empire.
338
  Although Vegetius was a late 
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imperial source, in this aspect the mandatory oath remained rather constant throughout 
the Republic to the Empire.
339
   
 The religious aspect of the soldier’s oath meant that soldiers were essentially 
living sacrifices, destined to either die in combat or be released after serving a pre-
determined amount of time.  Soldiers who survived to the end of their term were released 
from military service not only by the general, but also by the gods.
340
  Having faithfully 
fulfilled his promises to the gods and his fellow men, the Roman soldier was then 
returned to the status of the citizen.  Those soldiers who violated the oath became 
accursed and liable to suffer disciplinary punishments or even be dismissed in disgrace –
being marked as infamis.
341
  Using the mimetic violence theory of Rene Girard, Feldherr 
believed that sacrifice within ancient Italy was primarily a “social phenomenon.”342 By 
directing violence towards sacrificial victims, ancient societies were able to limit 
indiscriminate killing by satisfying the population’s need for violent retaliation.  This 
“scapegoat” concept of sacrifice is complementary to Cicero’s statement, as both stress 
the importance of limiting indiscriminate violence.  Although Livy attempts to depict the 
Samnite ritual as a profane affair, making each man more a victim than a participant, the 
sacraments conducted at Aquilonia should probably be thought of as being akin to a mass 
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devotio.
343
 It is no surprise then, that after the inclusion of the mandatory oath, 
documented cases of a devotio are non-existent, as every soldier is essentially made a 
sacred sacrifice.   
    The Romans obviously understood the religious significance of warfare. Even 
prior to the introduction of the ius iurandum, Papirius Cursor referred to warfare as being 
a consecrated service.
344
  According to Phang, the sacramentum was believed to have 
been a solemnly religious device, the breaking of which demanded the expiatory sacrifice 
of the violator.
345
  She, however, believed that the sacrificial nature of military executions 
dwindled after the third century BC, only to be revived again in the late Empire in 
opposition to, and later in compliance with, Christian tenets.
346
  While this appears to be 
an accurate representation, it is not due to a loss of religious significance. Here again 
Cicero provides insight, stating that any oath is a declaration sponsored by religious 
sanctity, and having been solemnly sworn before the gods, is to be upheld.
347
  After the 
ius iurandum, since every soldier essentially became a sacrificial victim, surrendering 
years of his life or its entirety, there was less need for religious veneer; in contrast with 
this, under the less rigid sacramentum and coniuratio, military executions were a rarity 
and thus required ritual observances for its legitimization.  Having taken the ius 
iurandum, the Roman soldier underwent conseratio (religious consecration), thus 
allowing for the sacred and legal monopolization of violence within the Roman world.   
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 The cumulative result of the introduction of the mandatory ius iurandum was the 
establishment of Rome’s professional army. Soldiers now enjoyed a distinct and separate 
status, ordained by both society and religion to conduct violence on their behalf.  The ius 
iurandum also helped ease some issues concerning class status.  In combination with the 
maniple system, which was organized by age rather than class, the ius iurandum 
effectively removed certain class stigmas, as soldiers served alongside their social 
inferiors/superiors.  Under the new army, old class distinctions were irrelevant, as all 
legionaries were equal, be they adsidui, equites, proletarii, or freedmen.
348
  It was the 
swearing of this ius iurandum which allowed this to occur, as their citizenship was 
temporary suspended while soldiers performed their sacred service.   An anecdote from 
Livy illustrates the unifying and liberating nature of the ius iurandum.  During the 
manpower shortages of 171 BC, Rome was forced to accept slaves into armed service 
under the command of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.   Despite serving with loyalty and 
distinction, the slaves of this unit must have presented an issue for the legion’s free-born 
citizens, who probably resented serving next to social inferiors.  Here the comments of 
Gracchus prove enlightening, as he addresses this very issue, stating:  
No disunity should be made among the different social orders by casting 
judgements on any one soldier on account of his former status.  The    
veteran soldier should allow himself to be placed on an equal footing              
with the recruit, the freeman with the volunteer slave; all should consider                      
                                                             
    
348
This is not to mean that there was not an established military hierarchy, which there most 
certainly was; however the average legionary would have been equal regardless of birth.  It should be 
noted that freedman and proletarii had previously been excluded from military service, except in the 
most dire of situations.  Following the Second Punic War, however, the property restriction for 
adssiduus status was substantially lowered. This was a way of making proletarii available for military 
service: Paul ErdKamp, “Manpower and Food Supply in the First and Second Punic Wars,” in A 
Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 
2011), 67: Under Gaius Marius the property restriction were formally abolished, allowing the 
proletarii to be conscripted into the army. 
105 
 
their fellow soldiers sufficiently respectable in character and birth, to           
whom the Roman people have entrusted their standards.
349
 
Having taken the ius iurandum, every soldier was equal, regardless of his prior condition, 
whether civilian or slave.  Not only did the ius iurandum make soldiers equal, regardless 
of class, but the status of miles came to be a coveted status.  Julius Caesar was able to 
quell a mutiny simply by addressing his troops as quirites (civilians), rather than as 
milites. 
350
  This illustrated that the status of miles was a highly respected social class and 
one that soldiers were loath to lose.  Furthermore, soldiers who were dismissed from 
service in dishonor were burdened with the social stigma of infamia which also entailed a 
loss of legal rights.
351
    
 The separation of civilian and soldier resulting from the ius iurandum also heavily 
contributed to later Roman notions of disciplina militaris.  Unfortunately, since no 
Samnite literature on this subject has survived, and Roman authors were more concerned 
with illustrating moral exempla than documenting their military practices, it is impossible 
to know what level of discipline the Samnites enforced within their legions.  While 
scholars can conclude with some certainty that the Samnites probably had a mandatory 
initiation rite for soldiers, how this actually affected Samnite military operations is 
unknown.  That the Samnites seemed able to defeat their more ‘civilized’ neighbours and 
were widely renowned for their martial prowess seems to suggest they employed an 
effective, organized military.
352
  Samnite operations against the Greek cities of Magna 
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Greacia led the Spartan colony of Tarentum to seek overseas aid.  The King of Epirus, 
Alexander Molossus, answered this plea.  Arriving in Italy at the helm of a highly trained 
army, he conducted a large scale campaign against the Oscan tribes in south Italy.  
Despite some successes, he did little to curtail the local tribes.  At some point following 
the death of Alexander of Epirus, the city of Tarentum made an alliance with the 
Samnites, ultimately showing they were unable to defeat them.
353
  According to Strabo 
this coincided with a tradition among the Greeks that Laconian colonists had joined with 
the Samnites, making them phihellenes, although he believed this was a rumour created 
to flatter their new allies.
354
  Regardless of the intentions of the Tarentines, this legendary 
association of the Samnites with Spartans nonetheless illustrates the military might of the 
Samnites, perhaps even being an attempt to explain how an Italian tribe of barbaroi could 
defeat a Hellenic army in the style of Alexander of Macedonia.  While this remains 
conjectural, it is probable that the Samnites were highly disciplined fighters.  
 To what degree the Samnites exacted discipline upon their soldiers is unknown 
and slightly beyond the scope of this discussion.  Their oath, however, provided the legal 
pretext for Samnite commanders to dispense justice with astonishing severity.  Again, 
any discussion of Samnite disciplina militaris is conjecture, but the classical sources do 
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imply that the swearing of the oath invoked harsh and bloody punishments.  In recording 
the parameters of the oath, Livy implicitly stated that all those who fled the field, thus 
violating their oath, were to be summarily executed.
355
  In Livy’s narrative, the taking of 
the oath at Aquilonia was accompanied by bloodshed, as those who refused the oath were 
cut down immediately.  While this may have occurred, it seems more likely to be a 
fabrication, as it was a clear perversion of the coniuratio, involving human sacrifice 
rather than animal sacrifice.
356
  
 While it is probable that the mandatory Samnite military oath allowed for strict 
military discipline, it is certain that it affected Roman discipina militaris.  Serving as the 
foundation for the later ius iurandum, the Samnite oath formed the basis of later Roman 
disciplinary punishments.  By making soldiers separate from civilians, the military oath 
allowed for the enactment of severe punishments, which would not have been acceptable 
for civilians.  Seneca would even compare the gladiatorial oath with the soldier’s oath, 
stating:  
     Eadem honestissimi huius et illius turpissimi auctoramenti verba    
 sunt: Uri, vinciri ferroque necari.
357
 
 In this same way, the words of the most honorable oath are the    
 same as the most vulgar one: To be branded, to be bound, and    
 to be killed by the sword.
358
    
 
                                                             
    
355
Livy X: 38:10. 
    
356
Habinek, 77;  While human sacrifice is extremely uncommon in Italic society, it was not unheard 
of, as even Rome resorted to human sacrifice in the Punic Wars: cf. Livy XXII:58: A coin minted 
from the Social War not only depicts Italic people practicing a coniuratio, but also reinforces the 
notion that the swearing of these oaths involved an animal sacrifice.  It appears that the incorrect 
usage of the coniuratio and its perversion was an intentional addition by Livy designed to create a 
moral exemplum about Samnite sacrilege.   
    
357
Sen. Ep. 37:1-2. 
    
358
Translation by author.  
108 
 
  While Seneca was an admirer of gladiators, seeing them as the embodiment of Stoic 
virtue and liberty, this comparison is nonetheless rather striking.
359
  Just like the 
gladiator, the Roman legionnaire became akin to a slave after taking the ius iurandum, 
liable to be enchained, beaten, and killed in horrible manners.  After the battle of Zama in 
202, Scipio Africanus is alleged to have crucified Roman deserters, while Latin deserters 
were simply beheaded.
360
  That a Roman general crucified Roman soldiers is a potent 
signal of the shifting severity of military discipline. Unlike the decimation, which was 
solely a military practice, crucifixion was generally reserved only for slaves, criminals, 
and outlaws.  Another interesting punishment comes from Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who 
is recorded to have had deserters trampled to death by elephants in c.168 – an early form 
of damnatio ad bestias.
361
  Thus, it seems Seneca’s statement proves correct in that the 
ius iurandum and the gladiator’s oath effectively turned citizens into slaves.362  Those 
soldiers who were deemed to have violated their oath could even face further 
enslavement after their military career.
363
  As the military term of service increased to 25 
years, it is unsurprising that many Romans opted to serve 5 years in the arena rather than 
25 years as a soldier.
364
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 It seems highly probable that the institutionalization of the Samnite-inspired ius 
iurandum ushered in a new level of severity for military punishments.  Military discipline 
gradually grew in its severity after 216 BC.  Yet this understanding is in direct 
contradiction with Roman imperial authors.  The histories of Sallust and Livy in 
particular would advance their Republican agendas by retrojecting stern military 
discipline far into the Republic’s earliest histories; Sallust in particular, believed that the 
end of the Punic Wars denoted a constant decline in military discipline.
 365
  Unfortunately 
these assertions prove to be anachronistic, as there is little evidence to support these 
claims.  Despite the atavistic desire of the classical authors to return to mos maiorum 
(ancestral tradition\ unwritten code), the Roman preconception of archaic severitas 
proves to be an anachronism; the civilian militia of Rome would simply not have 
tolerated the severity of imperial discipline.  This is not to say that citizens did not submit 
to discipline, but rather that without the legality of the ius iurandum such discipline was 
simple domination and cruelty.
366
  Consuls, for their part, seem to have understood that 
they were a part of a larger community in which the soldier-civilian (and their families) 
had a strong political voice.
367
  Even within the patrician order of the early-mid Republic, 
there appears a reluctance to administer punishments for military defeats, probably 
because other commanders could easily find themselves in a similar situation.
368
   
 If there is any hope of salvaging the Roman preconception of Republican severity, 
it rests solely upon the statements of Polybius.  Writing in the late second century BC, 
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Polybius is one of the first classical historians to document the Roman army in any detail.  
Of particular significance is his statement regarding the application of the decimatio, 
which indicates its use by the second century BC.
369
  Yet Polybius fails to call this an 
ancient practice and his comments seem to imply that this was actually a relatively new 
invention.  This discounts later sources, which credit the first decimation to Appius 
Claudius Sabinus Inregillensis in 471 BC.
370
  Aside from the semi-legendary nature of 
this incident, the attribution of this act to Appius Claudius is rather dubious.  Livy 
describes Appius as being a harsh and unforgiving figure, the embodiment of patrician 
privilege and partly responsible for the first secessio plebis.
371
  Claudius’s application of 
this unpopular punishment was probably a Livian invention designed to exemplify 
Claudius’s cruelty.  After this, the next recorded incident of decimation occurs in the first 
century BC, when the practice was ‘revived’ by Marcus Licinius Crassus.372  A similar 
‘revival’ is also recorded by Suetonius concerning Galba.373  Yet despite these claims, the 
decimatio probably was a product of the third or second century BC.  If the decimation 
had existed earlier, as the sources insist, it is surprising why are there no records of it.  
That the Romans did not decimate their legions after the Allia, the Caudine Forks, nor 
after Trebia or Trasimene suggests that this harsh form of discipline did not yet exist; 
even for these infamous lapses in Roman military valour, no direct punishments are 
recorded, other than the traditional method of social disgrace.  Although Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus believed that the original sacramentum gave consuls the right to inflict 
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capital punishments upon deserters, this was rarely enacted, as incidents involving 
military corporal punishments are extremely rare.
374
    
 While it remains speculation, it is certainly arguable that the Samnite-inspired ius 
iurandum allowed for the development of the Roman professional military.  By taking 
note of the Samnite example, the Romans in the third century BC instituted a mandatory 
soldier’s oath, required for citizens, allies, and slaves alike.  Although the ramifications 
of the new oath directly contributed to the fall of the Republic, through the swearing of 
an oath of fealty to individual generals, the ius iurandum proved instrumental to the size 
and longevity of Roman rule.  Just as the Samnite oath served as an initiation rite, 
likewise the Roman copy helped codify the army as a separate socio-political entity.  By 
officially separating the miles from the quiris, the Roman soldier now became sacer, 
enjoying a privileged social standing, yet subject to more severe notions of disciplina 
militaris.
375
  The ius iurandum not only sanctioned the emergence of a professional army, 
but was instrumental in facilitating the later expansion of the army, as it allowed for the 
admittance of less desirable social classes without much turbulence;  the ius iurandum 
warranted harsh training and military discipline while diminishing class prejudices within 
the increasingly stratified legion.  While to categorically claim a Samnite origin for all 
this is a stretch, it can be asserted with some certainty both that the Samnites had a 
mandatory initiation oath for their soldiers and that the Romans were aware of this 
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peculiar practice.   Unfortunately, the Samnites lost political independence shortly after 
Aquilonia, and therefore it is impossible to know what the Samnite army would have 
developed into.  However, given the time and right conditions, it is not unthinkable to 
suggest that the Samnite legion may have developed among the same lines as the Roman 
legion, given their similar weaponry, tactics, religion, and militarism; it is due to these 
similarities of Samnite and Roman militarism that the mandatory oath was incorporated 
into the Roman military with relative ease.  
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Conclusion 
 Given the problematic and inconclusive nature of the evidence, any study of 
Samnite society is inherently onerous.  Despite this handicap, the study of Samnite-
Roman interactions proves surprisingly rewarding.   It is not overly hard to understand 
why Salmon became enthralled with these defiant mountain warriors to the extent that 
other scholars have accused him of having become a Samnite himself.
376
  Unfortunately, 
his fascination with these people resulted in a strong bias which led him treat Samnite 
society separately from Roman society, having little overlap or cultural interaction.  The 
Samnites are most often remembered for their pugnacious attitude towards Roman rule.  
While the defiance of the Samnites is admirable, the real legacy of the Samnites lays not 
in antagonism but in reciprocity.   Samnite interactions with Rome show that they were 
not as uncooperative as often perceived, as the Samnites appear to have been content to 
function inside a larger coalition.  Their resistance during the Social War was probably 
less about establishing true independence than it was about addressing longstanding 
economic and political grievances.
377
  Far from being separatists, the Samnites were 
actively engaged in Roman politics.  During Sulla’s civil wars the Samnites remained 
strong supporters of the Marian faction.  Given their populares sympathies and Sulla’s 
pogrom, the Samnites were probably avid supporters of Caesar.  Although the Samnites 
were nominally conquered, they continued to actively interact with Rome, sometimes in 
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The Social War was instigated due to Roman mismanagement of their Italian allies rather than 
due to a strong Italian desire for independence.  Had the reforms of Marcus Livius Drusus been 
enacted, the war probably would not have occurred.  The Samnites wanted enfranchisement more than 
independence: App. Civ. I: 53:231. 
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cooperation with and other times in opposition to her, in order to pursue their own 
agenda. 
 Even at the height of Samnite independence, the Samnites were not necessarily 
hostile towards Rome.  In 354, the Samnites and the Romans are believed to have 
peacefully negotiated a partitioning of the Middle Liris Valley.
378
  Following the Roman 
betrayal in the First Samnite War, the Samnites harboured no ill will towards the 
Romans, allying with them in the Latin War.
379
  Even in the chaos of the Second Samnite 
War, the Samnites clearly did not view themselves as the natural enemies of Rome.  
Unlike Hannibal, who massacred the Roman legions at Cannae, the Samnites at the 
Caudine Forks released the entrapped Romans, perhaps hoping still for reconciliation.
380
  
Thus the Samnites enjoyed a complicated relationship with Rome.   
 The best illustration of the complex nature of Roman-Samnite relations is seen in 
the Samnite Wars, as these wars brought Samnites and Romans into close proximity; the 
natural result of this was a cultural exchange of ideas, religions, and institutions.  
Traditionally, scholars have conceptualized this cultural interaction as a ‘Romanization’ 
of Samnite society, which implies both a passive Samnite society and the inherent 
superiority of Roman culture.
381
  The presence of Samnitic elements within many Roman 
institutions clearly illustrates that these interactions were far more mutualistic, albeit not 
necessarily equal.  Although not definitive, the available evidence is suggestive of a 
Samnite origin for gladiatorial combat.  Likewise the maniple and military oath of the 
later Roman legion also appear to have been based on Samnitic models.  The Samnites 
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also appear to have helped shift Roman preconceptions concerning warfare.  By the end 
of the Samnite Wars, the Roman army had shifted away from the Greek phalanx and its 
armaments, in favour of the missile combat of the Samnites. Samnite culture was clearly 
not a submissive partner, but rather actively interacted with Roman society in a 
meaningful manner.  Thus, while the history of the Samnites became Roman history, in a 
similar manner, Roman history became Samnite history.    
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Appendix A: Figures and Maps 
 
 
Figure 1: Ancient Samnium c.4
th
 century.  Image originally in the Historical Atlas by William 
Shephered, 1911; in public domain as copyright has 
expiredhttp://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ancient_Samnium.png 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Ancient Lucania c.4
th
 century. Image originally in the Historical Atlas by William 
Shepherd, 1911; in public domain as copyright has expired.  
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lucania_map.jpg 
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Figure 3: The Tabula Osca.  Photo courtesy of Jononmac46; released into public domain December 
27, 2013.  http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Oscantablet-BM.JPG 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Tomb fresco in the Tomba Della Scimmia, 480-470 BC. Image in public domain.  
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tomba_della_scimmia_02.jpg  
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Figure 5: A Lucanian tomb fresco from Paestum, Tomb X, Laghetto necropolis, 4
th
 century. 
 Photo courtesy of Miguel Hermoso Cuesta; released into public domain April 26, 2014. 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Museo_Paestum._Tumba_lucana._04.JPG 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Lucanian tomb fresco from Paesum, Adriuolo necropolis, 350-320 BC.  Photo courtesy of 
Miguel Hermoso Cuesta; released into public domain July 14, 2013. 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Ancient_Lucanian_frescos_in_the_Museo_archeologic
o_nazionale_(Paestum)#mediaviewer/File:Museo_Paestum._Tumba_lucana._02.JPG  
